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Abstract
This paper settles the sample complexity of single-parameter revenue maximization by show-
ing matching upper and lower bounds, up to a poly-logarithmic factor, for all families of value
distributions that have been considered in the literature. The upper bounds are unified under
a novel framework, which builds on the strong revenue monotonicity by Devanur, Huang, and
Psomas (STOC 2016), and an information theoretic argument. This is fundamentally different
from the previous approaches that rely on either constructing an -net of the mechanism space,
explicitly or implicitly via statistical learning theory, or learning an approximately accurate
version of the virtual values. To our knowledge, it is the first time information theoretical argu-
ments are used to show sample complexity upper bounds, instead of lower bounds. Our lower
bounds are also unified under a meta construction of hard instances.
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1 Introduction
Suppose there is one item for sale and there are n bidders. Each bidder has a private value for
the item that is independently, but not necessarily identically, drawn from the corresponding prior
distribution, denoted as D = D1 × D2 × · · · × Dn. What is the optimal mechanism in terms of
the expected revenue? This classic problem of revenue maximization was solved by Myerson [22]
analytically. Given the prior distributions from which the bidders’ values are drawn, in particu-
lar, given their cumulative distribution functions (cdf), denoted as Fi’s, and probability density
functions (pdf), denoted as fi’s, the optimal auction is characterized by the virtual value functions:
φi(v) = v − 1− Fi(v)
fi(v)
. (1)
Informally, the optimal auction lets the bidder with the largest non-negative virtual value win the
item, and charges the winner a payment that equals the threshold value above which she wins.1
From an algorithmic viewpoint, however, the problem is not fully settled because the cdf and
pdf of the prior distributions are rarely given as input in practice. Cole and Roughgarden [10]
initiated the study of the following sample complexity problem: Suppose the algorithm has access
to the prior distributions only in the form of i.i.d. samples, how many samples are sufficient and
necessary for finding an approximately optimal auction? In particular, Cole and Roughgarden [10]
considered the multiplicative 1−  approximation, and regular and MHR distributions, and showed
that the sample complexity is polynomial in the number of bidders n, and −1. Subsequently, there
is a long line of work in this direction, either to improve the sample complexity bounds [11, 21, 25],
or to consider other families of distributions such as bounded support distributions, with both
multiplicative and additive approximations [11, 16], or the special cases with a single bidder [19]
or i.i.d. bidders [23], or the generalization to multiple heterogeneous items [1, 9, 17]. Despite many
efforts, we still cannot pin down the asymptotically optimal sample complexity for any of the
families of distributions considered in the literature, other than the special case of a single bidder.
Table 1 summarizes the state-of-the-art upper and lower bounds prior to this paper.
1.1 Previous Approaches
We first present a brief overview on the previous approaches for analyzing the sample complexity
of revenue maximization, which can be categorized into two groups, and explain their limitations.
Statistical Learning Theory. The first approach relies on constructing an -net of the mech-
anism space, namely, a subset of mechanisms such that for any distribution in the family, there
always exists an approximately optimal mechanism in the subset. Then, it remains to identify such
an approximately optimal mechanism in the -net. This can be done via a standard concentration
plus union bounds combo. Informally, the resulting sample complexity will be:2
log
(
size of the -net
)
2
.
The construction of the -net can be either explicit (e.g., [11, 16, 17]), or implicit via various learning
dimensions from statistical learning theory (e.g., [21, 25]).
1In general, the optimal auction chooses the winner based on an “ironed” version of the virtual values. We will
omit this in the introduction for simplicity of our discussions.
2This form relies on the assumption that O(−2) samples are sufficient for estimating the expected revenue of a
mechanism up to an  error, which need not be true in general especially with unbounded value distributions.
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Setting Lower Bound Upper Bound
Regular Ω(max{n−1, −3}) [10, 19] O˜(n−4) [11]
MHR Ω(max{n−1/2, −3/2}) [10, 19] O˜(n−3) [11, 21]
[1, H] Ω(H−2) [19] O˜(nH−3) [11]
[0, 1]-additive Ω(−2) [19] O˜(n−3) [11, 16]
Table 1: Best known sample complexity bounds prior to this paper
The main limitation of this approach is that the size of the -net seems to have an unavoidable
exponential dependence in −1 (see below for an example). Recall that the sample complexity
upper bound will be log(size of the  − net)/2, this exponential dependence leads to an at least
cubic dependence in −1 in the sample complexity upper bounds. For example, we sketch below
an explicit construction of the -net by Devanur et al. [11]. With an appropriate discretization, it
suffices to consider −1 distinct values. Further, since the optimal auction chooses the winner to
maximize virtual value, it suffices to know the ordering of 0 and φi(v)’s for all n bidders and all
−1 values. Hence, the number of auctions that we need to consider is no more than the number
of orderings over the n−1 virtual values φi(v)’s and 0, which equals (n−1 + 1)! and is singly
exponential in both n and −1. Getting rid of the exponential dependence in −1 intuitively means
that it suffices to consider a constant number of distinct values, which seems implausible.
Learning the Virtual Values. An alternative approach (e.g., [10, 23]) is to learn the individual
value distributions well enough to obtain enough approximately accurate information about the
virtual values, which induces a mechanism. Then, we analyze the revenue approximation using
the connections between expected revenue and virtual values. Importantly, this approach does
not need to take a union bound over exponentially many candidate mechanisms, circumventing
the bottleneck that introduces the undesirable cubic dependence in −1 in the learning theory
approach. Indeed, for the special case of independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) bidders
with [0, 1]-bounded distributions and additive approximation, Roughgarden and Schrijvers [23]
showed a sample complexity upper bound of O˜(n2−2), which is the only previous example, to our
knowledge, with a sub-cubic dependence in −1.
The main limitation of this approach roots in the form of the virtual value as defined in Eqn. (1).
It involves three components, the value v, the complementary cumulative distribution function
1 − Fi(v), a.k.a., the quantile, and the pdf fi(v). Here, the value v is given as input; the quantile
1 − Fi(v) is relatively easy to estimate accurately via standard concentration inequalities. It is,
however, impossible to get an accurate estimation of the density function fi in general. As a result,
it is infeasible to learn the virtual values accurately point-wise. This is a major technical hurdle that
prevents existing works using this approach from getting tight sample complexity upper bounds;
in particular, they all have super-linear dependence in n. Even for the special case of i.i.d. bidders,
the bound is quadratic in n [23]; the dependence is at least n7 for the general case [10]. Note that
a linear dependence in n follows almost trivially from the learning theory approach (e.g., [11]).
Prior Knowledge of the Distribution Family. Another limitation of the existing approaches
is that they generally rely on knowing the family of distributions upfront. Even for the special case
of a single bidder, the best known algorithms are different for regular, MHR, and bound-support
distributions (e.g., [19]). For MHR distributions, we may simply pick the optimal price with respect
to (w.r.t.) the empirical distribution, i.e., the uniform distribution over the samples. For regular
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Setting Lower Bound (Sec. 4) Upper Bound (Sec. 3)
Regular Ω(n−3) O˜(n−3)
MHR Ω˜(n−2) O˜(n−2)
[1, H] Ω(nH−2) O˜(nH−2)
[0, 1]-additive Ω(n−2) O˜(n−2)
Table 2: Sample complexity bounds in this paper
and [1, H] bounded support distributions, however, we need to introduce a threshold δ > 0 and to
choose the optimal price subject to having a sale probability at least δ. Further, the threshold is
chosen differently for regular and [1, H] bounded support distributions. If we fail to introduce a
threshold when it is an arbitrary regular distribution, the expected revenue may not converge to
the optimal at all [12]. If we set the threshold under the belief that the distribution has a [1, H]
bounded support while it is in fact an arbitrary regular distribution, the convergence rate will be
far from optimal. See Appendix A for a concrete example. It would definitely be nice to have a
more robust algorithm.
1.2 Our Contributions
We introduce an algorithm that achieves the optimal sample complexity, up to a poly-logarithmic
factor, simultaneously for all families of distributions that have been considered in the literature.
Our upper and lower bounds, summarized in Table 2, improve the best known bounds in all cases.
Our Algorithm. The algorithm constructs from the samples a dominated empirical distribution,
denoted as E˜ = E˜1 × E˜2 × · · · × E˜n, which is dominated by the true value distribution D in the
sense of first-order stochastic dominance, but is as close to D as possible. Then, it chooses the
optimal mechanism w.r.t. E˜. We call it the dominated empirical Myerson auction.
To construct the dominated empirical distribution, we first look at the estimation error by
the empirical distribution, in terms of the difference between the empirical quantiles and the true
quantiles. This can be bounded using standard concentration inequalities. For example, suppose a
value v has quantile q. Then, Bernstein inequality gives that, with high probability, its quantile in
the empirical distribution is approximately equal to q, up to an additive error of:
O˜
(√
q(1− q)
m
)
. (2)
To ensure that the error bound holds for all values, one can simply take a union bound at the cost of
an extra logarithmic factor inside the square root. Intuitively, the dominated empirical distribution
is obtained by subtracting this term from the quantile of each value v in the empirical distribution.
See Section 3 for the formal definitions of the dominated empirical distribution and the algorithm.
Next we explain the main difference between our algorithm and those in previous works, with
the exception of Roughgarden and Schrijvers [23]. Previous works generally pick the optimal
auction w.r.t. the empirical distribution, with a distribution-family-dependent preprocessing on
the sample values, in the form of truncating large but rare values and/or a discretization of the
values. The preprocessing is to avoid choosing the auction based on some rare but high values in
the samples. In contrast, our algorithm picks the optimal auction w.r.t. the dominated empirical
distribution, without any preprocessing or any knowledge of the underlying family of distributions.
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The conservative estimates of quantiles by the dominated empirical distribution implicitly tune
down the impact of rare but high values, simultaneously for all families of distributions.
The algorithm by Roughgarden and Schrijvers [23] is the most similar one to ours. They
also constructed a dominated empirical distribution and picked the corresponding optimal auction.
A subtle difference is that they used the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz (DKW) inequality [14] to
bound the estimation error of the empirical distribution and to construct the dominated empirical
distribution, which on one hand avoided losing a logarithmic factor from the union bound, but on
the other hand did not get the better bounds for values with quantiles close to 0 or 1 as in Eqn. (2).
The latter property is crucial for our analysis. We leave as an interesting open question whether
there is a strengthened version of the DKW inequality with quantile-dependent bounds. Such an
inequality will improve the logarithmic factor in the upper bounds of this paper. We stress that
while the algorithms are similar in spirit, our analysis is fundamentally different, as we will explain
next. Importantly, our sample complexity upper bounds hold for the general non-i.i.d. case while
the upper bound of Roughgarden and Schrijvers [23] holds only for the special case of i.i.d. bidders.
Analysis via Revenue Monotonicity. Our analysis consists of two components. The first one is
two inequalities that lower bound the expected revenue of the dominated empirical Myerson auction
on the true distribution, where the inequalities are enabled by the strong revenue monotonicity of
single-parameter problems by Devanur et al. [11]. The strong revenue monotonicity states that
the optimal auction w.r.t. a distribution that is dominated by the true distribution gets at least
the optimal revenue of the dominated distribution. In particular, running the dominated empirical
Myerson on the true value distribution D gets at least the optimal revenue of the dominated
empirical distribution E˜. Further, consider a doubly shaded version of the true distribution, denoted
as D˜, which intuitively is obtained by subtracting twice the error term in Eqn. (2) from the quantiles
of the true distribution. Then, D˜ is dominated by E˜ and, thus, its optimal revenue is at most that
of E˜. This weaker notion of revenue monotonicity is folklore in the literature and follows as a direct
corollary of the stronger notion. Therefore, we conclude that the expected revenue of the dominated
empirical Myerson auction is at least the optimal revenue of the doubly shaded distribution D˜. It
remains to compare the optimal revenue of D and D˜.
This idea is quite powerful on its own. The key observation is that D˜ approximately preserves
the probability density/mass of D almost point-wise, except for a small subset of values that have
little impact on the optimal revenue. Intuitively, this is because it consistently underestimates
the quantiles; in contrast, the empirical distribution has fluctuations in its estimations. Hence,
D˜ approximately preserves the virtual values of D almost point-wise, circumventing the technical
hurdle faced by the second previous approach discussed in Section 1.1. By this idea and standard
accounting arguments for the expected revenue, we can get the optimal sample complexity upper
bound for regular distributions in Table 2, and match the best previous upper bounds for the other
three families of distributions in Table 1. We present a formal discussion in Appendix C.
Analysis via Information Theory. To get the optimal sample complexity upper bounds for
all families of distributions under a unified framework, we need the second idea, namely, to bound
the difference between the optimal revenues of D and D˜ with an information theoretic argument.
The argument consists of two claims: 1) the distributions D and D˜ are similar in the information
theoretic sense so that it takes many samples to distinguish them, and 2) we can estimate the
expected revenue of any given mechanism on D and D˜ with a small number of samples. Concretely,
we will show that the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between D and D˜ is at most O˜( nm), omitting
some caveats which we will explain in details in Section 3. By standard information theoretic
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arguments, it implies that one needs at least Ω˜(mn ) samples to distinguish these two distributions.
For example, consider a [0, 1]-bounded distribution D and an additive  approximation. Suppose m
is at least O˜(n−2) as in Table 2. Then, we get that it takes at least C · −2 samples to distinguish
D and D˜ for some sufficiently large constant C > 0. On the other hand, it takes less than C · −2
samples to estimate the expected revenue of any mechanism on both D and D˜ up to an additive 
factor. Thus, the expected revenue of any mechanism differs by at most  on the two distributions;
otherwise, we can distinguish them with less than C · −2 samples by estimating the expected
revenue of the mechanism. As a result, the optimal revenues of D and D˜ differ by at most .
To our knowledge, this is the first time information theory is used to show sample complexity
upper bounds for revenue maximization. Previously, it was used only for lower bounds (e.g., [19]).
We believe it will find further applications in studying the sample complexity of multi-parameter
revenue maximization and other learning problems. We stress that our algorithm is constructive
and, in fact, can be implemented in quasi-linear time;3 both the doubly shaded distribution D˜ and
the information theoretic arguments are used only in the analysis.
Lower Bound Constructions. Our lower bounds are unified under a meta construction, with
some components chosen based on the family of distributions. We briefly sketch the construction
below. Let the first bidder’s value distribution be a point mass. She will serve as the default winner
in the optimal auction. The value distribution of each of the other n− 1 bidders will be either Dh
or D`. These two distributions satisfy that there is a value interval such that for any value in it,
the corresponding virtual value wins over bidder 1 if and only if the distribution is Dh. Both Dh
and D` will have an O( 1n) chance of realizing a value in this interval. Intuitively, to find a near
optimal mechanism we must be able to distinguish the bidders with distribution Dh from those
with distribution D`. Finally, we will construct Dh and D` to be similar so that it takes many
samples to distinguish them. The meta construction, inspired by the hard instances by Cole and
Roughgarden [10], can be viewed as a non-trivial generalization of the lower bound framework by
Huang et al. [19] for the special case of single bidder.
1.3 Other Related Works
Prior to Cole and Roughgarden [10], there were a few sporadic works that had the flavor of learning
the optimal price/auction from samples (e.g., [12, 15]).
The learning theory approach has also been used to learn approximately optimal auction among
a restricted family of simple auctions, both for single-parameter problems [20], and for multi-
parameter problems [1, 2, 9, 21, 25]. To learn an approximately optimal auction without restrictions
in multi-parameter problems, Dughmi et al. [13] showed that it needed exponentially many samples
in general;
Gonczarowski and Weinberg [17] proved a polynomial sample complexity upper bound for the
special case when bidders’ valuations were additive, if we allowed approximate truthfulness.
The online learning version has also been considered, both in the full information setting, i.e.,
the seller runs a direction revelation auction and observes the bidder’s valuation, and in the bandit
setting, i.e., the seller runs a posted price auction and only observes if the bidder buys the item.
Blum and Hartline [5] introduced the optimal algorithm in terms of a regret bound that scaled with
H, the upper bound on bidders’ values. Bubeck et al. [6] further improved the regret bound to scale
3For each bidder, it takes O(m logm) time to sort the samples and to compute the quantiles of the empirical
distribution, and O(m) time to compute the quantiles of the dominated empirical distribution, and O(m logm) times
to compute the convex hull of the corresponding revenue curve, which characterizes the optimal auction.
5
with the optimal price instead of H, and their algorithm matched the optimal sample complexity
bounds when the bidder’s values in different rounds were i.i.d. from a prior distribution.
Intriguingly, even the weaker notion of revenue monotonicity ceases to hold in multi-parameter
problems [18], while approximate versions are showed for restricted families of valuations [24, 26].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model
Let there be a single item for sale, and let there be n bidders. Each bidder i has a private
valuation vi ≥ 0 for getting the item, where vi is independently drawn from the corresponding
prior distribution Di. Thus, the value profile v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) follows a product distribution
D = D1 ×D2 × · · · ×Dn. We consider direct revelation mechanisms, each of which consists of an
allocation function x and a payment function p. First, each bidder submits a bid bi ≥ 0. Then,
xi(b) denotes the probability that bidder i gets the item, and pi(b) denotes the expected payment
by bidder i. Since there is only one item, we have
∑n
i=1 xi(b) ≤ 1 for all b. Each bidder i’s utility
is vi · xi(b)− pi(b). The seller seeks to maximize the expectation of the revenue, which is the sum
of bidders’ payments,
∑n
i=1 pi(b).
We remark that our algorithm and the framework for proving sample complexity upper and
lower bounds apply to more general single-parameter problems under matroid constraints. We
defer such extensions to Appendix F and Appendix G.
By the revelation principle, we focus on Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanisms, which
mean that for any bidder i and any value vi, conditioned on the other bidders bidding truthfully,
i.e., b−i = v−i, bidding bi = vi maximizes bidder i’s expected utility over the randomness of other
bidders’ values, and guarantees non-negative expected utility. A stronger notion is dominant strat-
egy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanisms, which means that bidding bi = vi always maximizes
bidder i’s utility, and guarantees it is non-negative, no matter what other bidders bid.
Myerson’s Optimal Auction. If the prior distribution D is given as input, the revenue maxi-
mizing mechanisms is fully characterized by Myerson [22]. Interestingly, Myerson’s optimal auction
is DSIC but is optimal among all BIC mechanisms. The characterization relies on the following
notion of virtual values. We first explain this notion assuming the distributions are continuous
and have positive densities as in Myeron’s original paper. For any bidder i, let Fi and fi denote
the cdf and pdf of the value distributions, the virtual value of bidder i when her value is i is
φi(vi) = vi − 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) . Let qi(vi) = PrDi [v > vi] be the quantile of vi. We have qi(vi) = 1− Fi(vi)
if Di is continuous.
If for all i, the virtual value φi(vi) is monotonically non-decreasing in vi, the distribution D is
said to be regular. If φi(vi) further has derivatives at least 1 point-wise, D is said to have monotone
hazard rate (MHR). Discrete versions of regular and MHR distributions over non-negative integers
are also considered in the literature [3, 15], where fi(vi) is replaced with the probability mass of vi.
The optimal auction is simple if the value distributions are MHR or even regular. It lets the bidder
with the largest non-negative virtual value win the item, breaking ties arbitrarily; if no bidder has
a non-negative virtual value, no one gets the item. The winner pays the threshold value at or above
which she wins.
For general distributions, virtual values may not be monotone. We need an extra step that
defines an ironed version of the virtual value that is monotone. We will use the following definition
of ironed virtual values so that it generalizes to general distributions that may be a mixture of
continuous and discrete distributions. Define the mapping from quantiles to values as vi(q) =
6
sup{v : 1 − Fi(v) ≤ q}. Define the revenue curve over the quantile space as Ri(q) = q · vi(q). Let
the ironed revenue curve R¯i(q) be the convex hull of Ri(q). The ironed virtual value φ¯i(vi) is the
right derivative of R¯i
(
1 − Fi(vi)
)
. Then, Myerson’s optimal auction picks a winner based on the
ironed virtual value instead of the virtual value, and charges the threshold value accordingly.
For any mechanism M and any distribution D, we let Rev(M,D) denote the expected revenue
of running M on D. Let MD denote Myerson’s optimal auction for D. For concreteness, assume MD
breaks ties over bidders with the same virtual values in the lexicographical order. Let Opt(D) =
Rev(MD,D) denote the optimal revenue, which is given by Myerson’s optimal auction.
Sample Complexity. Now suppose we can access the prior distribution D only in the form of
m i.i.d. samples. For a give family of distributions D (e.g., regular, MHR, bounded support, etc.),
the sample complexity of the revenue maximization problem is defined to be the (asymptotically)
smallest number m so that there is an algorithm satisfying that for any distribution D ∈ D, given
m i.i.d. samples from D, it learns a mechanism that is a 1 −  multiplicative approximation in
revenue with high probability. We are also interested in an  additive approximation in some cases.
2.2 Technical Preliminaries
Bernstein Inequality. Our algorithm and analysis will make use of the standard concentration
bound by Bernstein [4], as stated in the next lemma.
Lemma 1. Let X1, X2, . . . , Xm be i.i.d. random variables such that E[Xi] = 0, E[X
2
i ] = σ
2, and
|Xi| ≤M for some constant M > 0. Then, for all positive t, we have:
Pr
[ ∣∣∑m
i=1Xi
∣∣ > t ] ≤ 2 exp (− t2
2mσ2+(2/3)Mt
)
.
Strong Revenue Monotonicity. A distribution D first-order stochastically dominates another
distribution D˜, or simply D dominates D˜ for brevity, if for every i ∈ [n], Di dominates D˜i in that
for every value v, its quantile in Di is weakly larger than that in D˜i. We denote this by D  D˜.
Devanur et al. [11] showed a strong notion of revenue monotonicity as follows:
Lemma 2 (Strong Revenue Monotonicity [11]). Let D and D˜ be two product value distributions
such that D  D˜. Recall that MD˜ is the optimal auction for D˜. Then, we have:
Rev(MD˜,D) ≥ Rev(MD˜, D˜) .
The weaker notion of revenue monotonicity that is folklore in the literature follows as a corollary.
Lemma 3 (Weak Revenue Monotonicity). Let D and D˜ be two product value distributions such
that D  D˜. Then, we have:
Opt(D) ≥ Opt(D˜) .
Information Theory. Consider two probability measure P and Q over a sample space Ω. The
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence is defined as follows:
DKL(P‖Q) =
∫
Ω
ln
(
dP
dQ
)
dP .
We further consider the following symmetric version:
DSKL(P,Q) = DKL(P‖Q) +DKL(Q‖P ) .
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A classification algorithm A : Ωm 7→ {P,Q} distinguishes P and Q correctly with m samples if
for any D ∈ {P,Q}, A(ω1, ω2, . . . , ωm) = D with probability at least 23 , where ω1, ω2, . . . , ωm are
i.i.d. samples from D. The upper and lower bounds in this paper both use the following connection
between the number of samples needed to distinguish two distributions and their KL divergence.
Lemma 4 (e.g., see [19]). Suppose there is a classification algorithm that distinguishes P and Q
correctly with m samples. Then, the number of samples m is at least:
Ω
(
DSKL(P,Q)
−1) .
3 Upper Bounds
We present in this section an algorithm and its analysis that achieve the optimal sample complexity,
up to a poly-logarithmic factor, simultaneously for all families of distributions in the literature. The
proofs of some lemmas that are relatively standard are deferred to Appendix B. We also include a
discussion on the optimality of our algorithm in the special case of a single bidder in Appendix D.
3.1 Dominated Empirical Myerson
We first define the following function:
sm,n,δ(q)
def
= max
{
0, q −
√
2q(1− q) ln(2mnδ−1)
m
− 4 ln(2mnδ
−1)
m
}
. (3)
For a value distribution D, we abuse notation by letting sm,n,δ(D) denote a distribution such
that for any value v > 0 with quantile q in D, its quantile in sm,n,δ(D) is sm,n,δ(q). Let sm,n,δ(D)
denote the product distribution obtained by applying sm,n,δ to each coordinate of D.
Given this function, we now present our algorithm below as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Dominated Empirical Myerson
Input: m i.i.d. samples from the value distribution D = D1 ×D2 × · · · ×Dn
Output: a mechanism that decides the allocation and payment given bids from n bidders
1: Let Ei be the empirical distribution, i.e., the uniform distribution over the samples of bidder i.
2: Let E = E1 × E2 × · · · × En.
3: Let E˜ = sm,n,δ(E). That is, let q
Ei(v) be the quantile of Ei; the quantile of E˜i is as follows:
qE˜i(v) =
max
{
0, qEi(v)−
√
2qEi (v)(1−qEi (v)) ln(2mnδ−1)
m − 4 ln(2mnδ
−1)
m
}
if v > 0
1 if v = 0
4: Output Myerson’s optimal auction ME˜ w.r.t. E˜ = E˜1 × E˜2 × · · · × E˜n.
Our algorithm relies on constructing from the samples a distribution E˜ dominated by the true
value distribution but is as close to it as possible in a sense. We will refer to E˜ as the dominated
empirical distribution, which is intuitively a shaded version of the empirical distribution via function
sm,n,δ. This is formalized by the following two lemmas.
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Lemma 5. With probability at least 1− δ, for any value v ≥ 0, for any bidder i ∈ [n], v’s quantiles
in Di and Ei satisfy that:
∣∣qEi(v)− qDi(v)∣∣ ≤
√
2qDi(v)
(
1− qDi(v)) ln(2mnδ−1)
m
+
ln(2mnδ−1)
m
.
Lemma 6. Assuming the bounds in Lemma 5, we have:
D  E˜ .
We show that Algorithm 1 is “universally” optimal in the sense that it achieves the following
sample complexity upper bounds simultaneously for all families of distributions in the literature. We
will establish their optimality, up to a poly-logarithmic factor, with the lower bounds in Section 4.
Theorem 1. For any 0 <  < 1 and any n-bidder product value distribution D, Algorithm 1 returns
a mechanism with an expected revenue at least (1− )Opt(D), with probability at least 1− δ, if:
1. m is at least O(n−3 ln(n−1) ln(nδ−1−1)) = O˜(n−3) and D is regular; or
2. m is at least O(n−2 ln(−1) ln(n−1) ln(nδ−1−1)) = O˜(n−2) and D is MHR; or
3. m is at least O(nH−2 ln(nH−1) ln(nH−1δ−1)) = O˜(nH−2) and D has a bounded support
in [1, H] coordinate-wise.
We also have that its expected revenue is at least Opt(D)−  if:
4. m is at least O(n−2 ln(n−1) ln(n−1δ−1)) = O˜(n−2) and D has a bounded support in [0, 1]
coordinate-wise.
3.2 Meta Analysis
Step 1: Analysis via Revenue Monotonicity
The first idea in our analysis is to lower bound the expected revenue of the dominated empirical
Myerson auction with inequalities enabled by revenue monotonicity.
We start by defining an auxiliary distribution D˜ which intuitively is a doubly shaded version
of the original distribution D such that it is dominated by E˜. Consider the following function:
dm,n,δ(q)
def
= max
{
0, q −
√
8q(1− q) ln(2mnδ−1)
m
− 7 ln(2mnδ
−1)
m
}
(4)
We further allow it to operate on distributions the same way as the previous function sm,n,δ. Then,
let D˜ = dm,n,δ(D) be the auxiliary distribution.
Lemma 7. Assuming the bounds in Lemma 5, we have that:
E˜  D˜ .
Next, we lower bound the expected revenue of the dominated empirical Myerson auction by the
optimal revenue of the auxiliary distribution using revenue monotonicity.
Lemma 8. With probability at least 1− δ, we have:
Rev(ME˜,D) ≥ Opt(D˜) .
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Proof. We will prove the inequality when the bounds in Lemma 5 hold, which happens with prob-
ability at least 1− δ. It follows from the following sequence of inequalities:
Rev(ME˜,D) ≥ Rev(ME˜, E˜) (D  E˜ by Lemma 6, strong revenue monotonicity by Lemma 2)
= Opt(E˜)
≥ Opt(D˜) (E˜  D˜ by Lemma 7, weak revenue monotonicity by Lemma 3)
Given the above inequality, it suffices to show Opt(D˜) ≥ (1−)Opt(D) for the first three cases
which consider multiplicative approximation in Theorem 1, and to show Opt(D˜) ≥ Opt(D) − 
for the last case which considers additive approximation.
As we remarked in Section 1, this idea of bounding the expected revenue of the dominated
empirical Myerson auction via revenue monotonicity, instead of concentration inequalities as in
previous works, is quite powerful on its own. In particular, the auxiliary distribution D˜ approxi-
mately preserves the density and virtual value of the original distribution D almost point-wise. We
will explain in Appendix C how to build on this observation and standard accounting techniques
for expected revenue to show the optimal sample complexity upper bounds for the case of regular
distributions as stated in Theorem 1, and for the other three cases weaker upper bounds which
nevertheless match the best previous bounds already.
Step 2: Analysis via Information Theory
Our second idea is to use an information theoretic argument to show that the optimal revenue of
D˜ is a 1−  approximation (or an  additive approximation) to that of D. Let us first explain what
the analysis looks like in an idealized world, using the [0, 1]-bounded case as a running example.
Suppose that m ≥ O˜(n−2) as stated in Theorem 1. The analysis builds on two observations:
1. D and D˜ are close in KL divergence:
DSKL
(
D, D˜
) ≤ O˜( n
m
)
= O
(
2
)
,
for a sufficiently small constant in the second asymptotic notation. This is the main technical
component behind the information theoretic argument. See Lemma 10 for details.
2. For any mechanism and any [0, 1]-bounded value distribution, O(−2) samples are sufficient
for estimating an  additive approximation of the expected revenue. This part follows directly
from standard concentration bounds such as the Bernstein inequality (Lemma 1).
Then, we claim that the optimal revenue of D and D˜ must be within an additive factor of 
from each other. In particular, we claim that:
Rev(MD, D˜) ≥ Opt(D)−  .
Otherwise, we would be able to distinguish these two distributions with O(−2) samples by esti-
mating the expected revenue of MD. This contradicts the assumption that the KL divergence of
the two distributions is small.
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Formal Analysis. More generally, we show the following lemma.
Lemma 9. If two distributions D′ and D˜′ satisfy that for some N > 0, and some α > 0:
1. They are close in KL-divergence:
DSKL
(
D′, D˜′
) ≤ cN−1 ,
for some sufficiently small constant c > 0.
2. For any mechanism, and any of these two distributions, N samples runs are sufficient to
estimate the expected revenue up to an additive α factor with probability at least 23 .
Then, we have:
Opt(D˜′) ≥ Opt(D′)− 2α
Proof. We will show a stronger claim that for any mechanism M , it holds that:
Rev(M, D˜′) ≥ Rev(M,D′)− 2α .
Suppose not. Consider the following classification algorithm that takes N i.i.d. samples from an
unknown distribution that is either D′ or D˜′, and identifies which one it is correctly with probability
at least 23 .
1. Run M on the N samples from the unknown distribution to estimate the expected revenue
up to an additive α factor.
2. Return D′ if the estimate is at least Rev(M,D′)− α; return D˜′ otherwise.
The correctness of the algorithm follows by condition 2 in the lemma statement and the as-
sumption (for contrary) that Rev(M, D˜′) < Rev(M,D′) − 2α. Hence, there exists an algorithm
that distinguishes the two distributions using N samples. This, however, contradicts Lemma 4 and
condition 1 in the statement of this lemma, because they together indicate that no algorithm can
distinguish D′ and D˜′ correctly using N samples.
We stress that to get the contradiction it suffices to show the existence of the algorithm. How
one can acquire the necessary information, in particular, the value of Rev(M,D′), to implement
the algorithm is not important.
Intuitively, we would like to let D′ = D, D˜′ = D˜, and α = Opt(D) (or α =  in the case of
additive approximation) in the above lemma to finish the analysis. However, the two conditions in
Lemma 9 need not hold for distributions D and D˜ in general. The first condition may not hold, for
example, if some large values with tiny quantiles in D is not in the support of D˜ as a result of the
double shading by dm,n,δ. The KL divergence will be infinity in this case. The second condition
may also fail, when the value distribution D is unbounded, as in the regular and MHR case.
To circumvent these obstacles, we will construct surrogate versions of D and D˜, denoted as D′
and D˜′ respectively, which do satisfy the two conditions in statement of Lemma 9, and will relate
their optimal revenues with those of D and D˜ respectively to finish the analysis.
We first present in the next lemma some sufficient conditions under which we can bound the
KL divergence of a distribution and its doubly shaded version.
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Lemma 10. Suppose a distribution D′ has a bounded support in [0, u] such that ` = 0 and u are
point masses, whose probability masses, denoted as p` and pu, are at least
64 ln(2mnδ−1)
m . Further,
suppose D˜′ = dm,n,δ(D′) is the doubly shaded version of D′. Then, we have:
DSKL
(
D′, D˜′
)
= O
(
ln(mnδ−1)
m
ln
(
p−1` p
−1
u
))
= O˜
(
1
m
ln
(
p−1` p
−1
u
))
.
Proof. We will first prove the claim assuming there are no point masses other than u and `. Then,
the KL divergence can be written as:
DSKL(D
′, D˜′) =
(
pu ln
pu
dm,n,δ(pu)
+ dm,n,δ(pu) ln
dm,n,δ(pu)
pu
)
(5)
+
(
p` ln
p`
1− dm,n,δ(1− p`) +
(
1− dm,n,δ(1− p`)
)
ln
1− dm,n,δ(1− p`)
p`
)
(6)
+
∫
`<v<u
(
ln
dD′
dD˜′
+
dD˜′
dD′
ln
dD˜′
dD′
)
dD′ . (7)
Next, we bound each of these three terms separately.
First Term. Consider the first term. By our assumption that pu ≥ 64 ln(2mnδ
−1)
m , and noting that
pu ≤ 1− p` ≤ 1− 64 ln(2mnδ
−1)
m , we have:
pu − dm,n,δ(pu) =
√
8pu(1− pu) ln(2mnδ−1)
m
+
7 ln(2mnδ−1)
m
≤
√
16pu(1− pu) ln(2mnδ−1)
m
(8)
≤ 1
2
pu . (9)
Then, the first term can be bounded with the following sequence of inequalities:
(5) =
(
pu − dm,n,δ(pu)
)
ln
(
1 +
pu − dm,n,δ(pu)
dm,n,δ(pu)
)
≤
(
pu − dm,n,δ(pu)
)2
dm,n,δ(pu)
(ln(1 + x) ≤ x)
≤ 2
(
pu − dm,n,δ(pu)
)2
pu
(Eqn. (9))
≤ 32(1− pu) ln(2mnδ
−1)
m
(Eqn. (8))
≤ 32 ln(2mnδ
−1)
m
.
Second Term. The way that we bound the second term is similar. We first establish the following
inequality bounding the difference in the mass of ` in the two distributions:
(1− p`)− dm,n,δ(1− p`) =
√
8p`(1− p`) ln(2mnδ−1)
m
+
7 ln(2mnδ−1)
m
≤
√
16p`(1− p`) ln(2mnδ−1)
m
, (10)
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where the inequality follows by 64 ln(2mnδ
−1)
m ≤ p` ≤ 1− pu ≤ 1− 64 ln(2mnδ
−1)
m .
Then, the second term can bounded with the following sequence of inequalities:
(6) =
(
(1− p`)− dm,n,δ(1− p`)
)
ln
(
1 +
(1− p`)− dm,n,δ(1− p`)
p`
)
≤ ((1− p`)− dm,n,δ(1− p`))
2
p`
(ln(1 + x) ≤ x)
≤ 16(1− p`) ln(2mnδ
−1)
m
(Eqn. (10))
≤ 16 ln(2mnδ
−1)
m
.
Third Term. Consider any ` < v < u, which by our assumption is not a point mass. Let
q = qD
′
(v) denote its quantile in D′, and let d′m,n,δ denote the derivative of dm,n,δ. We have:
dD˜′
dD′
(v) = d′m,n,δ
(
q
)
.
Hence, we can rewrite the third term as:∫
`<v<u
(
ln
dD′
dD˜′
+
dD˜′
dD′
ln
dD˜′
dD′
)
dD′ =
∫ 1−p`
pu
(
d′m,n,δ(q)− 1
)
ln
(
d′m,n,δ(q)
)
dq . (11)
Next, note that:
∣∣d′m,n,δ(q)− 1∣∣ =
√
2 ln(2mnδ−1)
q(1− q)m |2q − 1|
≤
√
2 ln(2mnδ−1)
q(1− q)m (0 ≤ q ≤ 1)
≤ 1
2
. (qu ≤ q ≤ 1− q`, and qu, q` ≥ 64 ln(2mnδ
−1)
m )
Further note that x ln(1 + x) ≤ x2 for x ≥ 0 because ln(1 + x) ≤ x, and x ln(1 + x) < 2x2 for
−12 < x < 0 because ln(1 + x) ≥ − ln(1− 2x) ≥ 2x. The third term is bounded by:
(7) ≤
∫ 1−p`
pu
2
(
d′m,n,δ(q)− 1
)2
dq
≤
∫ 1−p`
pu
16 ln(2mnδ−1)
q
(
1− q)m dq
=
4 ln(2mnδ−1)
m
∫ 1−p`
pu
(
1
q
+
1
1− q
)
dq
=
4 ln(2mnδ−1)
m
(
ln
1− q`
qu
+ ln
1− qu
q`
)
≤ 4 ln(2mnδ
−1)
m
ln
(
p−1` p
−1
u
)
.
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Point Masses. Next consider a general distribution D′ that potentially has point masses other
than u and ` = 0. An important observation is that D′ and D˜′ have the same set of point masses.
To see this, note that the point masses are precisely the discontinuous points of the quantile
function. Further, the quantiles of D˜′ are obtained by applying function dm,n,δ to the quantiles
of D′. Finally, by the definition of dm,n,δ, and the assumptions on pu and p`, dm,n,δ is continuous
and strictly increasing on quantiles between qD
′
(u) = pu and q
D′(`+) = limv→`+ qD
′
(v) = 1 − p`.
Hence, there is a one to one mapping between the discontinuous points of qD and those of qD˜
′
.
Suppose ` < v < u is one such point mass. Let qv = q
D′(v) denote its quantile and let pv
denote its probability mass. Then, it corresponds to quantiles between qv − pv and qv. That is, the
integration from qv − pv to qv has to be subtracted from Eqn. (11). Instead, the contribution by v
to the KL divergence is:
pv ln
pv
dm,n,δ(qv)− dm,n,δ(qv − pv) +
(
dm,n,δ(qv)− dm,n,δ(qv − pv)
)
ln
dm,n,δ(qv)− dm,n,δ(qv − pv)
pv
= pv
(
dm,n,δ(qv)− dm,n,δ(qv − pv)
pv
− 1
)
ln
dm,n,δ(qv)− dm,n,δ(qv − pv)
pv
.
Note that (x−1) lnx is convex, and dm,n,δ(qv)−dm,n,δ(qv−pv) =
∫ qv
qv−pv d
′
m,n,δ(q)dq. By Jensen’s
inequality, the above is at most:∫ qv
qv−pv
(
d′m,n,δ(qv)− 1
)
ln
(
d′m,n,δ(qv)
)
dq .
That is, the contribution by v to the KL divergence is at most the integration over corresponding
quantile interval of v that is subtracted from Eqn. (11). Applying this argument to all point masses,
where there are at most countably infinitely many, we prove the lemma for general distributions
that may have point masses other than u and `.
In light of the conditions in Lemma 10 under which we can upper bound the KL divergence of a
distribution and its doubly shaded version given by function dm,n,δ, we will construct the surrogate
distribution D′ by truncating both the top and the bottom ends of the original distribution D, and
let D˜′ = dm,n,δ(D′) be the other surrogate distribution.
Let us first consider the truncation in the bottom end, which is easier. Define a function
tmin that takes a value distribution, say, Di for some bidder 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as input, and returns a
distribution obtained by truncating the lowest  fraction of values in Di down to 0. More precisely,
the quantile of any value v in tmin (Di) is defined as follows:
qt
min
 (Di)(v)
def
=
{
min{qDi(v), 1− } if v > 0
1 if v = 0
Further, for any product value distribution D, define:
tmin (D)
def
= tmin (D1)× tmin (D2)× · · · × tmin (Dn) .
The truncated version now has 0 as the smallest value in its support. Further, the probability
mass of 0 is at least , which is good enough for the purpose of using Lemma 10. On the other
hand, we want to make sure the optimal revenue after the truncation, namely, that of tmin (D), is
close to the optimal revenue of the original distribution D. This is established in the next lemma.
14
Lemma 11. For any product value distribution D, we have:
Opt
(
tmin (D)
) ≥ (1− )Opt(D) .
Next, let us turn to the truncation in the top end. This part is more subtle because it serves
two purposes, to satisfy the conditions in Lemma 10 for bounding the KL divergence of the sur-
rogate distributions, and to satisfy the second condition of Lemma 9, namely, to ensure that one
can estimate the expected revenue of any mechanism on the auxiliary distribution with standard
concentration bounds. For the latter, we would intuitively like to truncate values that are too large,
in particular, those that are much larger than the optimal revenue of the surrogate distribution
D′. Therefore, given an appropriate vector of value upper bounds v¯, we introduce the following
function tmaxv¯ for truncating the top end of the value distributions. For every bidder i, let t
max
v¯i (Di)
be the distribution obtained by truncating values larger than v¯i down to v¯i. In other words, the
quantiles of the truncated distribution is defined as:
qt
max
v¯i
(Di)(v)
def
=
{
qDi(v) if vi ≤ v¯i
0 if vi > v¯i
Further, for any v¯ = (v¯1, v¯2, . . . , v¯n), define:
tmaxv¯ (D) = t
max
v¯1 (D1)× tmaxv¯2 (D2)× · · · × tmaxv¯n (Dn) .
Informally, we will choose the value upper bounds v¯ such that 1) for any i, v¯i is upper bounded
by the optimal revenue Opt(D) multiplied by a factor that depends on the family of distributions,
and 2) for any i, qDi(v¯i) is at least Ω˜(
1
m). The first property is to satisfy the conditions in Lemma 9,
and the second property is the satisfy the conditions in Lemma 10.
We summarize the meta construction of the surrogate distributions and some of their properties
in the following lemma.
Lemma 12. For any product value distribution D, suppose there exist v¯, β ≥ Opt(D), and p > 0
such that:
1. β ≥ pv¯i for all i ∈ [n].
2. qDi(v¯i) is at least p
2n−1 for all i ∈ [n].
3. Opt(tmaxv¯ (D)) ≥ Opt(D)− β.
Then, there exist distributions D′ and D˜′ = dm,n,δ(D′) such that for any
m ≥ O(np−1−2 ln(mnδ−1) ln(np−1−1)), i.e., m ≥ O˜(np−1−2):
a) D′ and D˜′ have bounded supports in [0, p−1β] coordinate-wise.
b) Opt(D′) ≥ Opt(D)− 2β.
c) D˜  D˜′.
d) DSKL(D
′, D˜′) = O(p2).
Proof. Given such a vector v¯, define the surrogate distributions as:
D′ = tmin ◦ tmaxv¯ (D) ,
and
D˜′ = dm,n,δ(D′) .
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Part a) This is true by the above definition of D′, the definition of D˜′ = dm,n,δ(D′), and the first
condition in this lemma which implies v¯i ≤ p−1β for all i ∈ [n].
Part b) Note that D  tmaxv¯ (D). By weak revenue monotonicity (Lemma 3) and the third
condition of this lemma, we have:
Opt(D) ≥ Opt(tmaxv¯ (D)) ≥ Opt(D)− β .
Similarly, note that tmaxv¯ (D)  tmin ◦ tmaxv¯ (D). We have:
Opt
(
tmaxv¯ (D)
) ≥ Opt(tmin ◦ tmaxv¯ (D)) (weak revenue monotonicity, i.e., Lemma 3)
≥ (1− )Opt(tmaxv¯ (D)) (Lemma 11)
≥ Opt(tmaxv¯ (D))− Opt(D) (weak revenue monotonicity, i.e., Lemma 3)
≥ Opt(tmaxv¯ (D))− β .
Putting together we have:
Opt(D′) ≥ Opt(tmin ◦ tmaxv¯ (D)) ≥ Opt(D)− 2β .
Hence, we have proved part b) of this lemma.
Part c) Note that D  D′ since D′ is obtained by truncating both the top and bottom ends of
distribution D. Further, D˜ = dm,n,δ(D) and D˜
′ = dm,n,δ(D′). This part of the lemma now follows
because dm,n,δ is a monotone function.
Part d) For every bidder i, our construction ensures that D′i and D˜
′
i = dm,n,δ(D
′
i) satisfy the
conditions of Lemma 10 with u = v¯i, ` = 0, pu ≥ p2n−1 = Ω˜(m−1) (due to the second condition in
this lemma), and p` ≥  = Ω˜(m−1) (due to the definition of tmin ). Hence, by Lemma 10 we have:
DSKL(D
′
i, D˜
′
i) = O
(
ln(mnδ−1) ln(n−1p−1)
m
)
= O
(
p2
n
)
.
Then, this part of the lemma follows because DSKL(D
′, D˜′) =
∑n
i=1DSKL(D
′
i, D˜
′
i).
As a corollary, we lower bound the optimal revenue of the auxiliary distribution D˜ by that of the
original distribution D when m is sufficiently large, where the bounds depend on the parameters
β and p in the conditions of Lemma 12.
Corollary 13. Suppose there exist v¯, β, and p satisfying the conditions in Lemma 12. Then, we
have the following lower bound on the optimal revenue of the auxiliary distribution D˜:
Opt(D˜) ≥ Opt(D)− 4β ,
provided that the number of samples m is at least:
O
(
np−1−2 ln(np−1−1δ−1) ln(np−1−1)
)
= O˜
(
np−1−2
)
.
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Proof. Note that D′ and D˜′ have supports upper bounded by p−1β (part a) of Lemma 12), and
the expected revenue of any mechanism on any of these two distributions is at most Opt(D) ≤ β
(D  D′, D˜′ and weak revenue monotonicity by Lemma 3). By Bernstein inequality (Lemma 1),
O(p−1−2) sample runs are sufficient to estimate the expected revenue of any mechanism on any
of these two distributions up to an additive factor of β. Using Lemma 9 with N = p−1−2, and
α = β we get that:
Opt(D˜′) ≥ Opt(D′)− 2β .
By part c) of Lemma 12, and weak revenue monotonicity (Lemma 3), we have:
Opt(D˜) ≥ Opt(D˜′) .
Finally, by part b) of Lemma 12, we have:
Opt(D′) ≥ Opt(D)− 2β .
Putting together these three inequalities proves the corollary.
Finally, combining Lemma 8 and Corollary 13, we get the following corollaries which finish the
meta analysis. We remark that a direct combination of Lemma 8 and Corollary 13 gives 1 − 4
multiplicative approximation or 4 additive approximation. However, reducing the approximation
parameter by a factor of 4 increases the number of samples needed by at most a constant factor
because the bounds are polynomial in −1.
Corollary 14. Suppose there exist v¯ and p satisfying the conditions in Lemma 12 with β =
Opt(D). Then, with probability at least 1− δ, we have:
Rev(ME˜,D) ≥ (1− )Opt(D) .
provided that the number of samples m is at least:
O
(
np−1−2 ln(np−1−1δ−1) ln(np−1−1)
)
= O˜
(
np−1−2
)
.
Corollary 15. Suppose there exist v¯ and p satisfying the conditions in Lemma 12 with β = 1.
Then, with probability at least 1− δ, we have:
Rev(ME˜,D) ≥ Opt(D)−  .
as long as the number of samples m is at least:
O
(
np−1−2 ln(np−1−1δ−1) ln(np−1−1)
)
= O˜
(
np−1−2
)
.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Finally, we will prove the sample complexity upper bounds for specific families of distributions as
stated in Theorem 1. Given Corollary 14 and Corollary 15, it remains to find, for each family
of distributions, an appropriate vector of value upper bounds v¯, together with parameters β ≥
Opt(D) and p > 0, that satisfy the conditions in Lemma 12, which we restate below:
1. β ≥ pv¯i for all i ∈ [n].
2. qDi(v¯i) is at least p
2n−1 for all i ∈ [n].
3. Opt(tmaxv¯ (D)) ≥ Opt(D)− β.
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[1, H]-Bounded Support Distributions
Let β = Opt(D), which is at least 1 because the values are lower bounded by 1. Hence, by letting
p = 1H , the first condition holds for any choice of v¯, because the values are upper bounded by H.
Hence, we only need to choose v¯ to satisfy the other two conditions. Clearly, the larger v¯ is, the
more likely the third condition will hold. Hence, we will pick v¯i for each i ∈ [n] greedily to be the
largest value that satisfies the second condition. That is, define v¯ such that for all i ∈ [n]:
v¯i = sup
{
v : qDi(v) ≥ 
2
nH
}
.
It remains to verify the third condition, which holds due the following sequence of inequalities:
Opt(D)−Opt(tmaxv¯ (D)) ≤ H ·Pr
[∃i ∈ [n] : vi > v¯i] (values bounded by H)
≤ H ·
n∑
i=1
Pr
[
vi > v¯i
]
(union bound)
≤ H ·
n∑
i=1
2
nH
(definition of v¯i’s)
= 2 ≤ 2β . (β = Opt(D) ≥ 1)
Then, by Corollary 14, we get the sample complexity upper bound of O˜(nH−2) as stated in
Theorem 1 for [1, H]-bounded support distributions.
[0, 1]-Bounded Support Distributions
Since this case considers additive approximation, we will rely on Corollary 15 and thus let β = 1.
Then, the first condition holds trivially with p = 1. Similar to the previous case, we will choose v¯i
for each i ∈ [n] greedily to be the largest value that satisfies the second condition. That is, define
v¯ such that for all i ∈ [n]:
v¯i = sup
{
v : qDi(v) ≥ 
2
n
}
.
It remains to verify the third condition, which holds due the following sequence of inequalities:
Opt(D)−Opt(tmaxv¯ (D)) ≤ Pr
[∃i ∈ [n] : vi > v¯i] (values bounded by 1)
≤
n∑
i=1
Pr
[
vi > v¯i
]
(union bound)
≤
n∑
i=1
2
n
(definition of v¯i’s)
= 2 .
Then, by Corollary 15, we get the sample complexity upper bound of O˜(n−2) as stated in
Theorem 1 for [0, 1]-bounded support distributions.
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Regular Distributions
Let β = Opt(D), and p = 8 . Consider two vectors of value upper bounds, v¯
1 and v¯2. The former
is used to truncate values that are much larger than β = Opt(D) to satisfy the first condition.
The latter is used to truncate values with tiny quantiles to satisfy the second condition.
Concretely, define v¯1 such that for all i ∈ [n]:
v¯1i = p
−1β = p−1Opt(D) .
Define v¯2 such that for all i ∈ [n]:
v¯2i = sup
{
v : qDi(v) ≥ p
2
n
}
.
Finally, let v¯ be the coordinate-wise minimum of v¯1 and v¯2, i.e., for all i ∈ [n]:
v¯i = min
{
v¯1i , v¯
2
i
}
.
Clearly, we have tmaxv¯ = t
max
v¯2 ◦ tmaxv¯1 , and the first two conditions hold by our choice of v¯. It
remains to verify the last condition. We start by bounding the revenue loss due to tmaxv¯2 with an
argument similar to those in the previous two cases:
Opt
(
tmaxv¯1 (D)
)−Opt(tmaxv¯2 ◦ tmaxv¯1 (D))
≤ p−1β ·Prtmax
v¯1
(D)
[∃i ∈ [n] : vi > v¯2i ] (values bounded by v¯1i = p−1β)
≤ p−1β ·
n∑
i=1
Prtmax
v¯1
i
(Di)
[
vi > v¯
2
i
]
(union bound)
≤ p−1β ·
n∑
i=1
p2
n
(definition of v¯2i ’s)
= 2β .
Finally, we bound the revenue loss due to tmaxv¯1 . To do that, we need the following lemma by
Devanur et al. [11] that bounds the tail contribution of regular distributions.
Lemma 16 (Devanur et al. [11], Lemma 2). For any product regular distribution D, any 14 ≥ p > 0,
suppose v¯1 satisfies that v¯1i ≥ p−1Opt(D) for all i ∈ [n]. Then, we have:
Opt
(
tmaxv¯1 (D)
) ≥ (1− 4p)Opt(D)
By this lemma and our choice of p = 8 and β = Opt(D), we get that:
Opt
(
tmaxv¯1 (D)
) ≥ (1− 
2
)
Opt(D) = Opt(D)− 
2
β .
Putting together we have:
Opt
(
tmaxv¯2 ◦ tmaxv¯1 (D)
) ≥ Opt(D)− ( 
2
+ 2
)
β ≥ Opt(D)− β .
Then, by Corollary 14, we get the sample complexity upper bound of O˜(n−3) as stated in
Theorem 1 for the regular distributions.
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MHR Distributions
Let β = Opt(D), and p = 1c log(2/) for some sufficiently large constant c > 0. Similar to the regular
case, we consider two vectors of value upper bounds to satisfy the first and the second conditions
respectively. Concretely, define v¯1 such that for all i ∈ [n]:
v¯1i = p
−1β = p−1Opt(D) .
Define v¯2 such that for all i ∈ [n]:
v¯2i = sup
{
v : qDi(v) ≥ p
2
n
}
.
Finally, let v¯ be the coordinate-wise minimum of v¯1 and v¯2, i.e., for all i ∈ [n]:
v¯i = min
{
v¯1i , v¯
2
i
}
.
Again, we have tmaxv¯ = t
max
v¯2 ◦ tmaxv¯1 , and the first two conditions hold by our choice of v¯. It
remains to verify the last condition. Bounding the revenue loss due to tmaxv¯2 is verbatim to the
regular case; we include it as follows for completeness.
Opt
(
tmaxv¯1 (D)
)−Opt(tmaxv¯2 ◦ tmaxv¯1 (D))
≤ p−1β ·Prv∼tmax
v¯1
(D)
[∃i ∈ [n] : vi > v¯2i ] (value bounded by v¯1i = p−1β)
≤ p−1β ·
n∑
i=1
Prvi∼tmax
v¯1
i
(Di)
[
vi > v¯
2
i
]
(union bound)
≤ p−1β ·
n∑
i=1
p2
n
(definition of v¯2i ’s)
= 2β .
Finally, we bound the revenue loss due to tmaxv¯1 . To do that, we need the extreme value theorem
by Cai and Daskalakis [8]. It was originally proved only for continuous MHR distributions [8] but
in fact holds for discrete MHR distributions as well [7]. Below we restate an interpretation of the
extreme value theorem by Devanur et al. [11] and Morgenstern and Roughgarden [21], which is
most convenient for our analysis.
Lemma 17 (Cai and Daskalakis [8]). For any product MHR distribution D, and any 14 ≥  ≥ 0,
suppose v¯1 satisfies that v¯1i ≥ c log(1 )Opt(D) for all i ∈ [n] for a sufficiently large constant c.
Then, we have:
Opt
(
tmaxv¯1 (D)
) ≥ (1− )Opt(D) .
By this lemma and our choice of p = 1c log(2/) and β = Opt(D), we get that:
Opt
(
tmaxv¯1 (D)
) ≥ (1− 
2
)
Opt(D) = Opt(D)− 
2
β .
Putting together we have:
Opt
(
tmaxv¯2 ◦ tmaxv¯1 (D)
) ≥ Opt(D)− ( 
2
+ 2
)
β ≥ Opt(D)− β .
Then, by Corollary 14, we get the sample complexity upper bound of O˜(n−2) as stated in
Theorem 1 for the MHR distributions.
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4 Lower Bounds
In this section, we will prove the following sample complexity lower bounds for all four families of
distributions considered in this paper. Each of them matches the corresponding upper bound in
Section 3 up to a poly-logarithmic factor.
Theorem 2. Suppose an algorithm, given m samples, returns a mechanism that is a 1−  approx-
imation, with probability at least 0.99, for a given family of distribution. Then, we have:
1. m is at least Ω(n−3) if it is the family of regular distributions; or
2. m is at least Ω(n−2 ln−2 n) = Ω˜(n−2) if it is the family of MHR distributions; or
3. m is at least Ω(nH−2) if the family is [1, H]-bounded distributions.
Suppose it is an  additive approximation with probability at least 0.99. Then, we have:
4. m is at least Ω(n−2) if it is the family of [0, 1]-bounded distributions.
We will present the meta construction of hard instances in Section 4.1, and the corresponding
meta analysis in Section 4.2. Finally, we will explain in Section 4.3 how to use them to prove the
sample complexity lower bounds stated in Theorem 2.
4.1 Meta Hard Instance
Our construction of hard instances relies on finding three distributions in the family:
1. Db, a base distribution that is a point mass. The bidder with this distribution will serve as
the default winner unless another bidder realizes an extremely high value.
2. Dh, a distribution that has a relatively higher chance to win over Db.
3. D`, a distribution that has a relatively lower chance to win over Db.
Given these distributions, consider the following family of hard instances. Let bidder 1’s value
follows the base distribution Db. For any other bidder 2 ≤ i ≤ n, let her value distribution be
either Dh or D`. Formally, let:
H = {D : D1 = Db, and Di = Dh or D` for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n} .
Our plan is to show that any algorithm that gets a good enough approximation on all distributions
in H must take a lot of samples.
What properties do we need from these three distributions Db, Dh, and D` in order to show a
sample complexity lower bound? Let φb, φh, φ` denote the corresponding virtual value functions.
For some positive v0, v1, v2, where v1 may be +∞, and parameters 0 < p ≤ 1n and ∆ > 0, the three
distributions shall satisfy the following conditions:
a) Db is a point mass at v0.
b) The probability of v ≥ v2 is at most 1/n for both Dh and D`.
c) The probability of v1 > v ≥ v2 is at least p for both Dh and D`.
d) For any value v1 > v ≥ v2, we have φ`(v) + ∆ ≤ v0 ≤ φh(v)−∆.
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e) For any value v < v2, we have φ
h(v), φ`(v) ≤ v0. Our instances in fact satisfy that Dh and
D` are identical for values v < v2, but this is not necessary in the meta analysis below.
The above conditions are essential for our construction of the meta hard instance. The following
three, on the other hand, are for the convenience of our argument.
f) For any value v1 > v ≥ v2, we have
√
2 ≥ dD`
dDh
(v) ≥ 1√
2
. Here, the factor
√
2 can be replaced
by any other constants. Our instances will in fact satisfy this condition up to 1± .
g) Dh is regular.
h) Either v1 = +∞, or v1 is a point mass and an upper bound of values in both Dh and D`.
Intuitively, to construct a mechanism that gives an approximately optimal expected revenue
w.r.t. an unknown product value distribution inH, the algorithm must be able to distinguish bidders
with value distribution Dh, and those with value distribution D`, from the samples. Otherwise,
when there was exactly a bidder with a value between v1 and v2, the algorithm could not correctly
decide whether to pick her to be the winner over the default winner, namely, bidder 1. We formalize
this intuition with the following lemma and its proof in the next subsection.
Lemma 18. If an algorithm takes m samples from an arbitrary product value distribution D ∈ H
and returns, with probability at least 0.99, a mechanism whose expected revenue is at least:
Opt(D)−O(np∆) .
Then, the number of samples m is at least:
Ω
(
DSKL(D
h, D`)−1
)
.
4.2 Meta Analysis: Proof of Lemma 18
For some sufficiently small constant c, suppose for contrary that the algorithm, denoted as A, takes
m < c ·DSKL(Dh, D`)−1 samples. We will account for the revenue loss due to the mistakes made
by the mechanism chosen by algorithm A on a bidder by bidder basis. Concretely, for every bidder
2 ≤ i ≤ n, define a subset of value vector Vi as follows:
Vi =
{
b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn) : b1 = v0, v1 > bi ≥ v2, and bj < v2 for all j 6= 1, i
}
.
Note that V2,V3, . . . ,Vn are disjoint. We will account for the revenue loss due to the mistakes made
on the value vectors in each subset Vi separately.
Proof Sketch. The plan is to prove the lemma by showing there is a distribution D ∈ H such
that for at least Θ(n) different bidders 2 ≤ i ≤ n, the mechanism chosen by the algorithm with
m < c ·DSKL(Dh, D`)−1 samples will make a lot of mistakes on the value vectors in Vi and, as a
result, will have a revenue loss of Ω(p∆). This will be formalized in Corollary 25 and Lemma 26.
How do we prove that? We will do so by showing that for any 2 ≤ i ≤ n, and for a randomly
chosen pair of distributions in H that differ only in the i-th coordinate, the algorithm A must have
an Ω(p∆) revenue loss due to value vectors in Vi on at least one of the two distributions. This will
be formally proved in Lemma 23. Then, the aforementioned claim follows by a simple counting
argument, via Lemma 24.
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Intuitively, this is because the algorithm A cannot distinguish such a pair of distributions with
so few samples but the winner must be selected differently for the two distributions for value
vectors in Vi. This intuition is formalized with a sequence of claims in Lemma 19, Corollary 20,
and Lemma 21.
Formal Proof. Next, we instantiate the above proof sketch with a formal argument. Fix any
2 ≤ i ≤ n, and any D−i = ×j 6=iDj such that D1 = Db and Dj ∈ {Dh, D`} for all j 6= 1, i. Let
D1 = (D−i, Di = Dh) ∈ H and D2 = (D−i, Di = D`) ∈ H be a pair of distributions that differ
only in the i-th coordinate. Then, we have:
DSKL
(
D1,D2
)
= DSKL(D
h, D`) .
Then, since algorithm A takes m < c · DSKL(Dh, D`)−1 = c · DSKL(D1,D2)−1 samples for some
sufficiently small constant c, by Lemma 4, it cannot distinguish whether the underlying distribution
is D1 or D2 correctly, and as a result will choose a mechanism from essentially the same distribution
in both cases.
On the other hand, the optimal auctions w.r.t. D1 and D2 pick different bidders as the winner
for value vectors in Vi: the one w.r.t. D1 allocates the item to bidder i, while the one w.r.t. D2
allocates the item to the default winner, i.e., bidder 1. To instantiate this intuition, we first formally
show that the subsets of mechanisms that are close to optimal for D1 and D2 respectively, in terms
of their choices of winners when the value vector is in Vi, are disjoint. We start with the following
technical lemma.
Lemma 19. For any mechanism M , the probability that M picks bidder i as the winner, conditioned
on the value vector v is in Vi, differs by at most a factor of 2 whether v is drawn from D1 or D2.
In the proof of this lemma the the rest of the subsection, we will use Prv∼D:v∈V to denote the
conditional probability when v is drawn from D conditioned on v ∈ V for some subset V of value
vectors. Similarly, we will use Ev∼D:v∈V to denote the conditional expectation.
Proof. We have:
Prv∼D1:v∈Vi
[
M picks i as the winnner
] ·Prv∼D1[v ∈ Vi]
=
∫
v∈Vi
1(M picks i as the winnner) dD1
=
∫
v∈Vi
1(M picks i as the winnner)
dD1
dD2
(v) dD2
=
∫
v∈Vi
1(M picks i as the winnner)
dDh
dD`
(vi) dD
2 .
Here, 1(·) is the indicator function that equals 1 if the event is true. The last equality is due to
the definition D1 and D2, which differ only in the i-th coordinate.
Similarly, we also have:
Prv∼D2:v∈Vi
[
M picks i as the winner
] ·Prv∼D2[v ∈ Vi]
=
∫
v∈Vi
1(M picks i as the winner) dD2 .
Noting that v1 > vi > v2 for any v ∈ Vi, the claim now follows by condition f), which indicates
that
√
2 ≥ dD1
dD2
(v) ≥ 1√
2
and that the probability of v ∈ Vi differs by at most a factor of
√
2.
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Next, we define the following partitions of mechanisms:
M1 =
{
M : Prv∼D1:v∈Vi
[
M picks i as the winnner
] ≥ 2
3
}
,
M2 =
{
M : Prv∼D1:v∈Vi
[
M picks i as the winnner
]
<
2
3
}
.
We have the following as a corollary of Lemma 19.
Corollary 20. For any M ∈M1, we have that:
Prv∼D2:v∈Vi
[
M picks i as the winnner
] ≥ 1
3
.
For any value vector v ∈ Vi, recall that the optimal auction w.r.t. D1 will allocate the item
to bidder i while the one w.r.t. D2 will allocate the item to the default winner, i.e., bidder 1.
Therefore, if the underlying distribution is D1 and the value vector is in Vi, the mechanisms in
M2 will pick a wrong winner with probability at least 13 by definition. Similarly, if the underlying
distribution is D2 and the value vector is in Vi, the mechanisms in M1 will pick a wrong winner
with probability at least 13 by Corollary 20. Informally, the algorithm shall return a mechanism in
Mj most of the time if the underlying distribution is Dj for j ∈ {1, 2}, in order to ensure that the
expected revenue is close to optimal.
Next, we formalize the intuition that A is taking too few samples to make different decisions
on D1 and D2 with the following lemma.
Lemma 21. For either j = 1 or j = 2 (or both), we have:
Pr
[
A(Dj) ∈M3−j] > 1
3
.
Proof. Consider the following algorithm for distinguishing the two distributions D1 and D2. Given
an unknown distribution D ∈ {D1,D2}, run algorithm A with m samples from D. If the mech-
anism returned by A, i.e., A(D), is in M1, return D1; otherwise, return D2. By our assumption
for contrary that A takes less than c · DSKL(D1,D2)−1 samples, it cannot distinguish the two
distributions correctly (Lemma 4). That is, we have either:
Pr
[
A(D1) ∈M1] < 2
3
,
or:
Pr
[
A(D2) ∈M2] < 2
3
,
or both. The lemma now follows by thatM1 andM2 form a partition of the mechanism space.
Next, we will account for the revenue loss when the algorithm A makes a mistake in the sense
that it chooses a mechanism in M3−j when the underlying distribution is Dj as in the statement
of the previous lemma. We first need to show a technical lemma.
Lemma 22. For any value distribution D ∈ H, the optimal mechanism w.r.t. D always chooses
the bidder with highest virtual value as winner.
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Proof. Recall that the optimal auction picks the bidder with the highest non-negative ironed virtual
value. By our construction, bidder 1’s value is a point mass and always has virtual value equals her
value v0. Hence, non-negativity holds trivially. It remains to show that the highest ironed virtual
value coincides with the highest virtual value.
Suppose v1 < +∞ and there is at least one bidder 2 ≤ i ≤ n with value equals v1. Then, her
virtual value is also v1 due to condition h). As a result, the highest virtual value, ironed or not,
equals max{v0, v1}, because the ironed virtual value of any bidder 2 ≤ j 6= i ≤ n cannot exceed her
value, which is upper bounded by v1.
Next, suppose no bidder 2 ≤ i ≤ n has a value equals v1. In this case, any bidder whose value
distribution is D` cannot have an ironed virtual value higher than that of bidder 1. To see this,
first note that condition h) indicates v1 is not in any ironed interval. Further, by conditions d) and
e), the virtual value in D` is at most v0 for any value other than v1. The ironed value is simply the
average over the corresponding ironed interval, and therefore cannot be larger than v0.
It remains to consider bidders whose value distribution is Dh. The lemma now follows by
condition g), which states that Dh is regular.
In the following discussions, let φA(Dj)(v) denote the virtual value of the winner chosen by
A(Dj) when the value vector is v. By the connection between expected revenue and virtual values
showed by Myerson [22], and Lemma 22, we have:
Opt(D) = Ev∼D
[
max
k∈[n]
φk(vk)
]
=
∫
v
max
k∈[n]
φk(vk)dD , (12)
and
Rev(A(D),D) = Ev∼D
[
φA(D)(v)
]
=
∫
v
φA(D)(v)dD . (13)
To account for the revenue loss due to value vectors in Vi, we will consider the following quantity:∫
v∈Vi
(
max
k∈[n]
φk(vk)− φA(D)(v)
)
dD .
We will prove that the above quantity is at least Ω(p∆) for either D = D1, or D = D2, or both,
with the following lemmas.
Lemma 23. For either j = 1 or j = 2 (or both), we have:
PrA(Dj)
[
Ev∼Dj :v∈Vi
[
max
k∈[n]
φk(vk)− φA(Dj)(v)
]
≥ ∆
3
]
≥ 1
3
.
Proof. Let j ∈ {1, 2} be the superscript for which the conclusion of Lemma 21 holds. Then, it
suffices to show that:
A(Dj) ∈M3−j ⇒ Ev∼Dj :v∈Vi
[
max
k∈[n]
φk(vk)− φA(Dj)(v)
]
≥ ∆
3
.
Case 1: j = 1. By A(D1) ∈M2, we have that:
Prv∼D1:v∈Vi
[
M picks i as the winnner
]
<
2
3
.
By conditions d) and e), the definition of Vi, and that Di = Dh in D1, whenever the mechanism
picks anyone other than bidder i as the winner when the value vector v is in Vi, we have:
max
k∈[n]
φk(vk)− φA(D1)(v) ≥ ∆ .
So the claim follows.
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Case 2: j = 2. By A(D2) ∈M1, and Corollary 20, we have that:
Prv∼D2:v∈Vi
[
M picks i as the winnner
] ≥ 1
3
.
By condition d), the definition of Vi, and that Di = D` in D2, whenever the mechanism picks
bidder i, instead of bidder 1, as the winner when the value vector v is in Vi, we have:
max
k∈[n]
φk(vk)− φA(D2)(v) ≥ ∆ .
So the claim follows.
Let BD denote the set of bidders for which algorithm A performs badly in the sense that
the mechanism returned by A suffers from a revenue loss of at least ∆3 conditioned on Vi, with
probability at least 13 , as stated in Lemma 23:
BD =
{
i : PrA(D)
[
Ev∼D:v∈Vi
[
max
k∈[n]
φk(vk)− φA(D)(v)
]
≥ ∆
3
]
≥ 1
3
}
.
Lemma 24. Suppose a distribution D is drawn uniformly at random from H. Then, for any
2 ≤ i ≤ n, we have:
Pr
[
i ∈ BD
] ≥ 1
2
.
Proof. Fix any 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Enumerating over all possible D−i, D1 and D2 together enumerate over
all distributions D ∈ H. Note that Lemma 23 holds for any D−i. We get that at least half of the
distributions D ∈ H satisfy that i ∈ BD.
As a direct corollary, we have the following.
Corollary 25. There exists D ∈ H such that:∣∣BD∣∣ ≥ n− 1
2
.
In the rest of the analysis, we will focus on the distribution D ∈ H for which the conclusion of
the above corollary holds. The above corollary is already good enough for proving a weaker claim
that the expected revenue loss is at least Θ(np∆), noting that the probability of having a value
vector in Vi for each i ∈ BD is Θ(p) due to conditions c) and d).
To get the stronger claim in Lemma 18 that we have the stated revenue loss with a (small)
constant probability, we need to further discuss the the number of bidders for which the realized
mechanism A(D) performs poorly. For any realization of the mechanism A(D) returned by the
algorithm, further let BD,A(D) denote the set of bidders for which the returned mechanism A(D)
performs poorly in the sense that it suffers from a revenue loss at least ∆3 on Vi:
BD,A(D) =
{
i : Ev∼D:v∈Vi
[
max
k∈[n]
φk(vk)− φA(D)(v)
]
≥ ∆
3
}
.
We will show in the next lemma there are at least Θ(n) such bidders with constant probability.
Lemma 26. For the distribution D ∈ H in Corollary 25, with probability at least 0.01, we have:
|BD,A(D)| ≥
n
15
.
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Proof. Let p∗ = PrA(D)
[|BD,A(D)| ≥ n15] denote the probability that the conclusion of the lemma
holds. We need to show that p∗ ≥ 0.01.
On one hand, each bidder i ∈ BD is in BD,A(D) with probability at least 13 by definition. The
expected size BD,A(D) is therefore lower bounded as follows:
EA(D)
[|BD,A(D)|] ≥ 13 · n− 12 = n− 16 ≥ n12 .
On the other hand, we have:
EA(D)
[|BD,A(D)|] ≤ n15 ·PrA(D) [|BD,A(D)| < n15]+ n ·PrA(D) [|BD,A(D)| ≥ n15]
=
n
15
· (1− p∗) + n · p∗
≤ n
15
+ n · p∗ .
Putting together gives p∗ ≥ 160 > 0.01.
We now complete the proof of Lemma 18 by arguing that the algorithm must suffer from the
stated revenue loss on the distribution D in Corollary 25 and Lemma 26. In particular, when the
conclusion of Lemma 26 is true, which happens with probability at least 0.01, we have the following
sequence of inequalities:
Opt(D)−Rev(A(D),D)
=
∫
v
(
max
k∈[n]
φk(vk)− φA(D)(v)
)
dD (Eqn. (12) and Eqn. (13))
≥
∑
i∈BD,A(D)
∫
v∈Vi
(
max
k∈[n]
φk(vk)− φA(D)(v)
)
dD (Vi’s are disjoint)
=
∑
i∈BD,A(D)
Ev∼D:v∈Vi
[
max
k∈[n]
φk(vk)− φA(D)(v)
]
·Prv∼D
[
v ∈ Vi
]
≥
∑
i∈BD,A(D)
∆
3
·Prv∼D
[
v ∈ Vi
]
(definition of BD,A(D))
≥
∑
i∈BD,A(D)
∆
3
· p ·
(
1− 1
n
)n−2
(conditions c) and d))
≥
∑
i∈BD,A(D)
p∆
3e
≥ np∆
45e
. (Lemma 26)
4.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Given Lemma 18, it remains to construct three distributions Db, Dh, and D` from each family of
distributions that satisfy the conditions listed in Section 4.1, and that:
i) np∆ = Ω
(
Opt(D)
)
(or np∆ = Ω() in the case of additive approximation).
j) DSKL(D
h, D`)−1 matches the corresponding sample complexity lower bound in Theorem 2.
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To make the argument of condition j) easier, we will use a slight generalization of a technical
lemma by Huang et al. [19] as follows.
Lemma 27 (Huang et al. [19], Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5). Suppose two distributions P and
Q over a sample space Ω, and Ω1,Ω2, . . . ,Ωk form a partition of Ω. Further, suppose for every
1 ≤ i ≤ k, there exists 0 ≤ i < 1 such that:
(1 + i)
−1 ≤ dP
dQ
(ω) ≤ (1 + i) ,
for every ω ∈ Ωi. Then, we have:
DSKL(P,Q) ≤
k∑
i=1
Pi(Ωi) · 2i .
We present in Figure 1 the revenue curves, in the quantile space, of the distributions Dh and D`
that we use in the sample complexity lower bounds for different families of distributions. Readers
who are familiar with this interpretation of value distributions may find the revenue curves more
intuitive than the formal definitions of these distributions in the proof.
[1, H]-Bounded Distributions
Let v0 = 1, v1 = H, v2 =
H
2 +
1
2 , p =
2
nH , and ∆ = H be the parameters. Let D
b be a singleton
at v0 = 1. Define D
` and Dh with the following probability mass:
fD`(v) =

1− 2nH v = 1 + 1n − 1nH
1−
nH v =
H
2 +
1
2
1+
nH v = H
fDh(v) =

1− 2nH v = 1 + 1n − 1nH
1+
nH v =
H
2 +
1
2
1−
nH v = H
Conditions a), b), c), f), and h) hold trivially by the construction. Condition j) follows by the
construction and Lemma 27, with Ω1 = {1}, 1 = 0, and Ω2 = {H2 + 12 , H}, 2 = . Further,
conditions d), e), and g) can be verified from the virtual values of Dh and D` below, which follow
from straightforward calculations:
φ`(v) =

1 v = 1 + 1n − 1nH
1−Θ(H) v = H2 + 12
H v = H
φh(v) =

1 v = 1 + 1n − 1nH
1 + Θ(H) v = H2 +
1
2
H v = H
To show condition i), by our choice of p and ∆ and, thus, np∆ = Θ(), it remains to show that
Opt(D) ≤ O(1) for all D ∈ H. This follows by that the optimal revenue is upper bounded by the
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(a) [1, H]-bounded support distributions with n = 4, H = 4, and  = 0.2.
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(b) Regular distributions with n = 4, and  = 0.2.
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(c) MHR distributions with n = 8, and 0 = 0.2.
Figure 1: The revenue curves, in the quantile space, of the distributions that we use to prove
the sample complexity lower bounds for different families of distributions. In each sub-figure, the
left-hand-size and the right-hand-side are the revenue curves of Dh and D` respectively for the
corresponding family. The critical value interval between v2 and v1 is plotted in bold (red).
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expected optimal social welfare, which is upper bounded by:(
1 +
1
n
− 1
nH
)
+H ·Pr
[
∃i : vi > 1 + 1
n
− 1
nH
]
≤ 1 + 1
n
− 1
nH
+H ·
n∑
i=2
Pr
[
vi > 1 +
1
n
− 1
nH
]
≤ 1 + 1
n
− 1
nH
+H · (n− 2) · 2
nH
< 3 .
Now that we have verified all conditions, we get the sample complexity lower bound as stated
in Theorem 2 for [1, H]-bounded support distributions as a corollary of Lemma 18.
[0, 1]-Bounded Support Distributions
In this case, we can simply take the construction of the [1, H]-bounded case, with H being a large
constant, say H = 10, and scale all values down by a multiplicative factor of 1H . Then, we have the
sample complexity lower bound as stated in Theorem 2.
Regular Distributions
Let v0 =
3
2 , v1 = +∞, v2 = 1 + 1 , p = n , and ∆ = 12 be the parameters. Let Db be a singleton at
v0 =
3
2 , and define D
` and Dh with support [1 + 1n ,+∞) and the following pdf:
fDh(v) =
{
1
n(v−1)2 1 +
1
n ≤ v < 1 + 1
1−
n(v−2)2 v ≥ 1 + 1
fD`(v) =
1
n(v − 1)2
The corresponding complementary cdf’s are as follows, via simple calculations:
1− FDh(v) =
{
1
n(v−1) 1 +
1
n ≤ v < 1 + 1
1−
n(v−2) v ≥ 1 + 1
1− FD`(v) =
1
n(v − 1)
Conditions a), b), c), f), and h) hold trivially by the construction. Condition j) follows by the
construction and Lemma 27, with Ω1 = [1 +
1
n , 1 +
1
 ), 1 = 0, and Ω2 = [1 +
1
 ,+∞), 2 = .
Further, conditions d), e), and g) can be verified from the virtual values of Dh and D` below, which
follow from straightforward calculations:
φDh(v) =
{
1 1 ≤ v < 1 + 1
2 v ≥ 1 + 1
φD`(v) = 1
To show condition i), by our choice of p and ∆ and, thus, np∆ = Θ(), it remains to show that
Opt(D) ≤ O(1) for all D ∈ H. This holds because the virtual values in the three distributions Db,
Dh, and D` are at most 2 everywhere as discussed above.
Now that we have verified all conditions, we get the sample complexity lower bound as stated
in Theorem 2 for regular distributions as a corollary of Lemma 18.
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MHR Distributions
Assume for simplicity of notations that log n is an integer. Let 0 =  log n. Let v0 = log n− 1 + 0,
v1 = log n + 1, v2 = log n, p =
1
n , and ∆ = 0 be the parameters. Let D
b be a singleton at
v0 = log n − 1 + 0. Define Dh and D` with support {0, 1, 2, . . . , log n + 1} and the following
probability mass:
fDh(v) =

2−v−1 0 ≤ v < log n
1+0
2n v = log n
1−0
2n v = log n+ 1
fD`(v) =

2−v−1 0 ≤ v ≤ log n
1
2n v = log n
1
2n v = log n+ 1
The corresponding complementary cdf are as follows, via simple calculations:
1− FDh(v) =

2−v−1 0 ≤ v < log n
1−0
2n v = log n
0 v = log n+ 1
1− FD`(v) =

2−v−1 0 ≤ v < log n
1
2n v = log n
0 v = log n+ 1
Conditions a), b), c), f), and h) hold trivially by the construction. Condition j) follows by the
construction and Lemma 27, with Ω1 = {0, 1, 2, . . . , log n− 1}, 1 = 0, and Ω2 = {log n, log n+ 1},
2 = 0. Further, conditions d), e), and g) can be verified from the virtual values of D
h and D`
below, which follow from straightforward calculations:
φDh(v) =

v − 1 0 ≤ v < log n
log n− 1 + 20 −O(20) v = log n
log n+ 1 v = log n+ 1
φD`(v) =

v − 1 0 ≤ v < log n
log n− 1 v = log n
log n+ 1 v = log n+ 1
To show condition i), by our choice of p and ∆ and, thus, np∆ = Θ( log n), it remains to show
that Opt(D) ≤ O(log n) for all D ∈ H. This holds trivially because the values are upper bounded
by log n+ 1 in all three distributions Db, Dh, and D`.
Now that we have verified all conditions, we get the sample complexity lower bound as stated
in Theorem 2 for MHR distributions as a corollary of Lemma 18.
Finally, we include in Appendix E a discussion on the sample complexity lower bounds under
the same framework if we insist on using only continuous MHR distributions.
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A Previous Approaches Rely on Prior Knowledge
In this section we demonstrate through an example how the previous approaches crucially rely on
knowing the family of distributions upfront, even in the special case of a single bidder. In this case,
any truthful auction is effectively posting a take-it-or-leave-it price. What the algorithm needs to
do is to learn an approximately optimal price from the samples.
Consider a value distribution D with the following cdf:
FD(v) =
{
v
v+2 0 ≤ v ≤ 2
2v−3
2v−2 v > 2
This is a regular distribution. Its revenue curve in the quantile space is piece-wise linear with two
segments, as shown in Figure 2. The x-axis is the quantile; the y-axis is the expected revenue for
a price with the corresponding quantile in D. The optimal price is 2. At this price, the bidder
will buy the item with probability 0.5. The corresponding optimal revenue is 1. Importantly, the
distribution has a heavy tail in the sense that the expected revenue does not diminish as the price
tends to infinity; instead, it tends to 0.5.
We evaluated the performance of the best known previous algorithms for regular, MHR, and
[1, H]-bounded support (with H = 100) distributions on D. The results are shown in Figure 3.
The x-axis is the number of samples. The y-axis is the approximation ratio in comparison with the
optimal revenue as the number of samples increases.
First, suppose we have an incorrect belief that the underlying distribution is an MHR distri-
bution and simply use the empirical price, i.e., the optimal price w.r.t. the uniform distribution
over the samples [12, 19]. Then, the approximation ratio does not converge at all, as shown by
the dashed line in Figure 3. To see why, consider any large integer m and let there be m samples.
Consider the value m2 whose quantile is roughly
1
m . In expectation, there shall be 1 sample, out of
all m of them, that has value at least m2 . However, there is a non-negligible probability that there
are at least 3 such samples, in which case it may seem superior than the actual optimal price 2,
based on the empirical distribution. As a result, the approximation ratio fails to converge to 1.
Next, suppose we have the correct prior knowledge and choose the best know previous algorithm
for regular distributions [12, 19], which picks the best price according to the empirical distribution
subject to having a sale probability at least δ = m−1/3. This is called the δ-guarded empirical price.
The choice of δ = m−1/3 is due to the choice of δ =  in previous works when the goal is a multiplica-
tive (1− )-approximation, and the optimal sample complexity of Θ˜(−3) for regular distributions.
Then, the approximation ratio quickly converges to almost 1 with less than a thousand samples, as
shown by the solid line in Figure 3.
Further, suppose we have an incorrect belief that the underlying distribution is a [1, H]-bounded
distribution, with H = 100. The best known previous algorithm for this case is again the δ-guarded
empirical price, but with a different choice of δ = 1H [19]. Then, even though the approximation
ratio does converge to 1, it is much slower, as shown by the dotted line in Figure 3.
Last but not least, the performance of the algorithm proposed in this paper, which picks the
optimal price w.r.t. the dominated empirical distribution with no prior knowledge on the family
of distributions at all, is almost indistinguishable with that of the best known previous algorithm
tailored specifically for regular distributions. This is shown by the dash-dotted line in Figure 3.
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Figure 2: The revenue curve, in the quantile space, of a heavy-tail regular distribution that demon-
strates how previous approaches crucially rely on knowing the family of distributions
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Figure 3: The convergences of best known previous algorithms for different families of distributions
when there is a single bidder whose value distribution is defined by the revenue curve in Figure 2
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B Missing Proofs in Section 3
B.1 Proof of Lemma 5
Consider quantiles that are multiples of 1m and the corresponding values. There are at most m of
them. We will show that a stronger bound holds for each of such value v:
∣∣qEi(v)− qDi(v)∣∣ ≤
√
2qDi(v)
(
1− qDi(v)) ln(2mnδ−1)
m
+
2 ln(2mnδ−1)
3m
. (14)
Then, the lemma follows because the bound on difference in the quantiles of any value in the two
distributions bares an extra additive factor of at most 1m <
ln(2mnδ−1)
3m .
Now fix any such value v. Consider random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xm such that Xi = 1 if the
i-th sample is at least v and Xi = 0 otherwise. Then, we have q
Ei(v) = 1m
∑m
i=1Xi. By Bernstein’s
inequality (Lemma 1), with σ2 = qDi(v)
(
1− qDi(v)), M = 1, and
t =
√
2qDi(v)
(
1− qDi(v))m ln(2mnδ−1) + 2
3
ln(2mnδ−1) ,
the bound stated in Eqn. (14) holds for v fails with probability at most δmn .
By union bound we get that, with probability at least 1 − δ, Eqn. (14) holds for all m values
that correspond to quantiles that are multiples of 1m , and all n bidders.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 6
Fix any value v > 0. We would like to show that qE˜i(v) ≤ qDi(v). By Lemma 5, we have:
qEi(v) ≤ qDi(v) +
√
2qDi(v)
(
1− qDi(v)) ln(2mnδ−1)
m
+
ln(2mnδ−1)
m
Of course, we also have that qEi(v) ≤ 1.
Further, by the definition of E˜, we have qE˜i(v) = sm,n,δ
(
qEi(v)
)
. Noting that sm,n,δ is monotone,
it suffices to show qE˜i(v) ≤ qDi(v) when the above equation holds with equality.
To simply notation, we write qD = qDi(v), qE = qEi(v), and qE˜ = qE˜i(v), and let c = ln(2mnδ
−1)
m
in the rest of the proof. We would like to show that qE˜ ≤ qD if
qE = qD +
√
2cqD(1− qD) + c ≤ 1 , (15)
and
qE˜ = sm,n,δ(q
E) = qE −
√
2cqE(1− qE)− 4c . (16)
Rearranging terms qD and c to the left-hand-side of Eqn. (15) and squaring both sides, we get
that it is equivalent to: (
qE − qD − c)2 = 2cqD(1− qD) .
Next, organize the terms as a quadratic equation of qD:
(1 + 2c)
(
qD
)2 − 2qEqD + (qE − c)2 = 0 .
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Solving it and noting that qD ≤ qE , we get that:
(1 + 2c)qD = qE −
√
2cqE(1− qE)2 + 4c2qE − (1 + 2c)c2
≥ qE −
√
2cqE(1− qE)2 + 4c2 (qE ≤ 1)
≥ qE −
√
2cqE(1− qE)2 − 2c .
Further, the left-hand-side is at most qD + 2c because qD ≤ 1. Putting together with Eqn. (16),
we have that:
qD ≥ qE −
√
2cqE(1− qE)2 − 4c = qE˜ .
So the lemma follows.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 7
Fix any value v > 0. We would like to show that qE˜i(v) ≥ qD˜i(v). By Lemma 5, we have:
qEi(v) ≥ qDi(v)−
√
2qDi(v)
(
1− qDi(v)) ln(2mnδ−1)
m
− ln(2mnδ
−1)
m
Of course, we also have that qEi(v) ≥ 0.
Further, by the definition of E˜, we have qE˜i(v) = sm,n,δ
(
qEi(v)
)
. Noting that sm,n,δ is monotone,
it suffices to show qE˜i(v) ≥ qD˜i(v) = dm,n,δ
(
qDi(v)
)
when the above equation holds with equality.
To simply notation, we write qD = qDi(v), qD˜ = qD˜i(v), qE = qEi(v), and qE˜ = qE˜i(v), and let
c = ln(2mnδ
−1)
m in the rest of the proof. We would like to show that q
E˜ ≥ qD˜ if
qE = qD −
√
2cqD(1− qD)− c ≤ 1 , (17)
and
qE˜ = sm,n,δ(q
E) = qE −
√
2cqE(1− qE)− 4c , (18)
and
qD˜ = dm,n,δ(q
D) = qD −
√
8cqD(1− qD)− 7c . (19)
By Eqn. (17) and Eqn. (18), we have:
qE˜ = qD −
√
2cqD(1− qD)−
√
2cqE(1− qE)− 5c .
Comparing with the right-hand-side of Eqn. (19), it suffices to show that:√
2cqD(1− qD) + 2c ≥
√
2cqE(1− qE)
This holds due to the following sequence of inequalities:
2cqE(1− qE) = 2cqD(1− qD) + 2c(qD − qE)(2qD − 1)− 2c(qD − qE)2
≤ 2cqD(1− qD) + 2c(qD − qE)− 2c(qD − qE)2 (qD ≤ 1)
≤ 2cqD(1− qD) + 2c(qD − qE)
= 2cqD(1− qD) + 2c
√
2cqD(1− qD) + 2c2 (Eqn. (17))
<
(√
2cqD(1− qD) + 2c)2 .
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B.4 Proof of Lemma 11
Recall that MD denotes Myerson’s optimal auction w.r.t. D. Consider the following mechanism M
for distribution tmin (D):
1. Given a value profile v, define an auxiliary value profile v′ such that for every i ∈ [n], let
v′i = vi if vi > 0, and let v
′
i be a random sample from Di conditioned on its quantile is between
1−  and 1.
2. Let i∗ and p∗ be the winner and her payment given by MD on the auxiliary value profile v′.
3. Let i∗ be the winner of running M on value profile v.
4. Let i∗ pay p∗ if vi > 0, and 0 otherwise.
Let us compare the expected revenue from running M on the true value profile v drawn from
tmin (D), and that from running MD on the corresponding auxiliary value profile v
′, which follows
D. We will do so by comparing the contribution from each bidder i in these two cases.
Fix any bidder i and any value profile v−i and, thus, the corresponding auxiliary value profile
v′−i of the bidders other than i. Since the auxiliary values of the other bidders are fixed, from i’s
viewpoint, MD sets a price p
∗ and i wins the item so long as her value is at least p∗. Therefore,
the expected payment by i from running MD on the auxiliary value profile v
′ is qDi(p∗) · p∗; that
from running M on the true value profile is v is: qt
min
 (Di)(p∗)p∗ = min{1 − , qDi(p∗)} · p∗. Note
that they differ by at most a 1−  multiplicative factor for any value of qDi(p∗).
Hence, bidder i’s contribution to the expected revenue of M on tmin (D) is at least a 1 −  of
her contribution to the optimal revenue of D. Summing over all bidders proves the lemma.
C Upper Bounds without Information Theory
In this section, we will demonstrate how to prove weaker sample complexity upper bounds building
only on revenue monotonicity, without the information theoretic argument. Recall that what we
need to prove is the following inequality when the number of samples m is sufficiently large:
Opt(D˜) ≥ (1− )Opt(D)
To simplify the discussion, let us introduce a dummy bidder n+ 1 whose value is a point mass
at 0. Then, we have D˜n+1 = Dn+1, and the virtual value of the bidder is always 0. As a result, we
can assume without loss of generality that the item is always allocated to some bidder.
Further, recall that we assume for simplicity that the optimal mechanism MD breaks ties over
bidders with the same ironed virtual value in the lexicographical order. Therefore, if two bidders
i < j have the same virtual value, we will still write φ¯i(vi) > φ¯j(vj) in the following discussions.
The main technical lemma is the following, which states that D˜ approximately preserves the
density of D almost point-wise, except for the values with very small quantiles.
Lemma 28. For any product distribution D, suppose D˜ = dm,n,δ(D), and m is at least
4 ln(2mnδ−1)
2
.
Then, for any i ∈ [n], and any v such that qDi(v) ≥ Ω( ln(2mnδ−1)
m2
)
, we have:
1 +

2
≥ dD˜i
dDi
(v) ≥ 1− 
2
.
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Proof. Let q = qDi(v) for simplicity in this proof. By q ≥ Ω( ln(2mnδ−1)
m2
)
and m ≥ 4 ln(2mnδ−1)
2
, we
get that dm,n,δ(q) is continuous at q. Therefore, if v is not a point mass, we have:
dD˜i
dDi
(v) = d′m,n,δ(q)
= 1−
√
8 ln(2mnδ−1)
m
1− 2q
2
√
(1− q)q .
On the other hand, suppose v is a point mass. Denote its probability mass as pv. We have:
dD˜i
dDi
(v) =
dm,n,δ
(
q
)− dm,n,δ(q − pv)
pv
=
∫ q
q−pv d
′
m,n,δ(x)dx
pv
≥ d′m,n,δ(q) (monotonicity of d′m,n,δ)
= 1−
√
8 ln(2mnδ−1)
m
1− 2q
2
√
(1− q)q .
Then, the lemma follows by q ≥ Ω( ln(2mnδ−1)
m2
)
.
Next, we present in the next lemma a meta analysis that will be further specialized for each
family of distributions.
Lemma 29. Suppose D have a bounded support in [0, v¯1] × [0, v¯2] × · · · × [0, v¯n] such that the
probability mass of v¯i is at least Ω
( ln(2mnδ−1)
m2
)
in Di for all i ∈ [n], and m is at least 4 ln(2mnδ
−1)
2
.
Then, we have:
Opt(D˜) ≥ (1− )Opt(D) .
Proof. Consider the optimal mechanism MD w.r.t. D. We can write the expected revenue by
enumerating all possible configuration of the highest bidder and the second highest bidder in terms
of ironed virtual values.
Opt(D) =
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∫∫
φ¯i(vi)>φ¯j(vj)
φ¯−1i
(
φ¯j(vj)
) · ∏
k 6=i,j
Prvk∼Dk
[
φ¯k(vk) < φ¯j(vj)
]
dDidDj .
Next, suppose we run the same mechanism MD on the auxiliary distribution D˜. Its expected
revenue can be written in a similar fashion as:
Rev(MD, D˜) =
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∫∫
φ¯i(vi)>φ¯j(vj)
φ¯−1i
(
φ¯j(vj)
) · ∏
k 6=i,j
Prvk∼D˜k
[
φ¯k(vk) < φ¯j(vj)
]
dD˜idD˜j
≥
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∫∫
φ¯i(vi)>φ¯j(vj)
φ¯−1i
(
φ¯j(vj)
) · ∏
k 6=i,j
Prvk∼Dk
[
φ¯k(vk) < φ¯j(vj)
]
dD˜idD˜j
≥
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∫∫
φ¯i(vi)>φ¯j(vj)
φ¯−1i
(
φ¯j(vj)
) · ∏
k 6=i,j
Prvk∼Dk
[
φ¯k(vk) < φ¯j(vj)
]
(1− )dDidDj
=(1− )Opt(D) .
Here, the first inequality is due to stochastic dominance, i.e., Dk  D˜k; the second inequality
follows by Lemma 28. The lemma then follows by Opt(D˜) ≥ Rev(MD, D˜).
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To simplify notations in the rest of the section, we define a function tmax that truncate the top
-fraction of the distribution. For every bidder i ∈ [n], let tmax (Di) be the distribution obtained
by truncating top  fraction of values to the value whose original quantile is equal to . In other
words, the quantiles of the truncated distribution is defined as:
qt
max
 (Di)(v)
def
=
{
qDi(v) if  ≤ qDi(v) ≤ 1
0 if 0 ≤ qDi(v) < 
Further, for any product value distribution, define:
tmax (D) = t
max
 (D1)× tmax (D2)× · · · × tmax (Dn) .
Regular Distributions
We first explain how to prove the optimal O˜(n−3) sample complexity upper bound without using
information theory. The main technical lemma is the following.
Lemma 30. For any regular product distribution D, we have:
Opt
(
tmax
2n
(D)
) ≥ (1− ) ·Opt(D) .
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.6 in Devanur et al. [11]. The main difference is that
Devanur et al. [11] truncate in the value space while here we truncate in the quantile space.
Proof. For simplicity of notations, we extend the definition of virtual values to the quantile space
and abuse notation in letting φi(qi) and φˆi(qi) denote the virtual value of the i-th bidder when her
value has quantile qi in Di and t
max

2n
(Di) respectively. Let the truncation point with quantile

2n in
distribution Di be v¯i. Given any n-dimensional quantile vector q, let H(q) = {i ∈ [n], qi ≤ 2n},
and L(q) = {i ∈ [n], qi > 2n}.
First, consider a quantile vector q ∈ [0, 1]n \ [ 2n , 1]n. We claim that:∫
[0,1]n\[ 
2n
,1]n
max
i
φˆi(qi)dq ≥ (1− )
∫
[0,1]n
max
i∈H(q)
φi(qi)dq (20)
On one hand, left-hand-side of (20) is lower bounded by:∫
[0,1]n\[ 
2n
,1]n
max
i
φ¯i(qi)dq ≥
∑
j
∫
qj∈[0, 2n ],q−j∈[ 2n ,1]n−1
max
i
φ¯i(qi)dq
≥
∑
j
∫
qj∈[0, 2n ],q−j∈[ 2n ,1]n−1
vjdq (φˆj(qj) = vj)
=

2n
(
1− 
2n
)n−1∑
j
vj
≥ 
2n
(
1− 
2
)∑
j
vj .
On the other hand, the right-hand-side of (20), omitting the 1− 2 factor, is upper bounded by:∫
[0,1]n
max
i∈H(q)
φi(qi)dq ≤
∫
[0,1]n
∑
i∈H(q)
φi(qi)dq
=
∑
i∈[n]
∫
[0, 
n
]
max{φi(qi), 0}dqi .
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Thus, it suffices to show that ∀i ∈ [n], we have:

2n
vi ≥
(
1− 
2
)∫
[0, 
2n
]
max{φi(qi), 0}dqi .
The left-hand-side, 2nvi, is exactly the expected revenue of price vi, which has quantile

2n .
That is, we have:

2n
vi = R
Di
( 
2n
)
.
The right-hand-side without the 1− 2 factor,
∫
[0, 
2n
] max{φi(qi), 0}dqi, is the maximum expected
revenue subject to having a sale probability at most 2n . That is, we have:∫
[0, 
2n
]
max{φi(qi), 0}dqi = max
0≤q≤ 
2n
RDi(q) .
Suppose q∗i is the quantile of the monopoly price if there is a single bidder with value distribution
Di. Then, if q
∗
i ≥ 2n , by concavity of revenue curve of regular distributions, it must be increasing
from 0 to q∗i . In particular, we have max0≤q≤ 2n R
Di(q) = RDi( 2n).
On the other hand, suppose q∗i ≤ 2n . Then, by the concavity of revenue curve of regular
distributions, we have:
RDi
( 
2n
)
≥ 1−

2n
1− q∗i
RDi(q∗i ) +

2n − q∗
1− q∗i
RDi(1)
≥
(
1− 
2n
)
RDi(q∗i )
=
(
1− 
2n
)
max
0≤q≤ 
2n
RDi(q) .
Putting together proves (20).
Next, we will show that:∫
[ 
2n
,1]n
max
i
φˆi(qi)dq ≥ (1− )
∫
[0,1]n
max
i∈L(q)
φi(qi)dq (21)
The left-hand-side of (21) can be rewritten as follows because Di and t
max

2n
(Di) are identical,
and L(q) = [n], for quantiles q greater than 2n :∫
[ 
2n
,1]n
max
i
φi(qi)dq =
∫
[ 
2n
,1]n
max
i∈L(q)
φi(qi)dq .
Further, note that for any i ∈ [n], any q = (qi,q−i), and any q′ = (q′i,q−i) where qi < 2n ≤ q′i,
we have L(q) ⊆ L(q′). Thus, maxi∈L(q) φi(qi) ≤ maxi∈L(q′) φi(qi). Therefore, Eqn. (21) follows by
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a hybrid argument as follows:∫
[ 
2n
,1]n
max
i∈L(q)
φi(qi)dq ≥
(
1− 
2n
)∫
[0,1]×[ 
2n
,1]n−1
max
i∈L(q)
φi(qi)dq
≥
(
1− 
2n
)2 ∫
[0,1]2×[ 
2n
,1]n−2
max
i∈L(q)
φi(qi)dq
≥ . . .
≥
(
1− 
2n
)n ∫
[0,1]n
max
i∈L(q)
φi(qi)dq
≥
(
1− 
2
)∫
[0,1]n
max
i∈L(q)
φi(qi)dq .
Summing (20) and (21) give:∫
[0,1]n
max
i
φˆi(qi)dq ≥ (1− )
(∫
[0,1]n
max
i∈H(q)
φi(qi) + max
i∈L(q))
φi(qi)
)
dq
≥ (1− )
∫
[0,1]n
max
i
φi(qi)dq .
The left-hand-side and the right-hand-side are precisely the optimal revenue of distributions
tmax
2n
(D) and D respectively.
We now finish the analysis for regular distributions with the following sequence of inequalities:
Rev(ME˜,D) ≥ Opt(D˜) (Lemma 7)
= Opt (dm,n,δ(D))
≥ Opt
(
dm,n,δ ◦ tmax
2n
(D)
)
(weak revenue monotonicity, i.e., Lemma 3)
≥ (1− )Opt
(
tmax
2n
(D)
)
(Lemma 29, and m ≥ O˜(n−3))
≥ (1− 2)Opt(D) (Lemma 30)
MHR Distributions, Weaker Upper Bound
Note that the upper bound of O˜(n−3) also holds for MHR distributions since all MHR distributions
are regular.
[1, H]-Bounded Support Distributions, Weaker Upper Bound
Rather than truncating at quantile 2n , we will pick the truncation point to be

Hn to bound the
contribution by large values up to H. We first show the following lemma.
Lemma 31. For any [1, H]-bounded support distribution D, we have:
Opt
(
tmax
Hn
(D)
)
≥ (1− )Opt(D) .
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Proof. Since the values are upper bounded by H, we have:
Opt(D)−Opt
(
tmax
Hn
(D)
)
≤ H ·Pr
[
∃i, q(vi) ≤ 
Hn
]
≤ H ·
n∑
i=1
Pr
[
q(vi) ≤ 
Hn
]
= H ·
n∑
i=1

Hn
=  .
The lemma now follows by Opt(D) ≥ 1 because the values are lower bounded by 1.
The rest of the analysis is similar to the regular case. If the number of samples m is at least
O˜(nH−3), we have the following sequence of inequalities:
Rev(ME˜,D) ≥ Opt(D˜) (Lemma 7)
= Opt (dm,n,δ(D))
≥ Opt
(
dm,n,δ ◦ tmax
Hn
(D)
)
(weak revenue monotonicity, i.e., Lemma 3)
≥ (1− )Opt
(
tmax
Hn
(D)
)
(Lemma 29, and m ≥ O˜(nH−3))
≥ (1− 2)Opt(D) (Lemma 31)
[0, 1]-Bounded Support Distributions, Weaker Upper Bound
Similar to the previous cases, we first establish a lemma that bound the revenue loss due to the
truncation of small quantiles.
Lemma 32. For any [0, 1]-bounded support distribution D, we have:
Opt
(
tmax
n
(D)
)
≥ Opt(D)−  .
The proof is almost verbatim to that of Lemma 31. We include it for completeness.
Proof. Since the values are upper bounded by 1, we have:
Opt(D)−Opt
(
tmax
n
(D)
)
≤ Pr
[
∃i, qDi(vi) ≤ 
n
]
≤
n∑
i=1
Pr
[
qDi(vi) ≤ 
n
]
=
n∑
i=1

n
=  .
The rest of the analysis is also almost verbatim to the previous case, changing the parameters
appropriately and replacing Lemma 31 with Lemma 32. Concretely, if the number of samples m is
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at least O˜(n−3), we have the following sequence of inequalities:
Rev(ME˜,D) ≥ Opt(D˜) (Lemma 7)
= Opt (dm,n,δ(D))
≥ Opt
(
dm,n,δ ◦ tmax
n
(D)
)
(weak revenue monotonicity, i.e., Lemma 3)
≥ (1− )Opt
(
tmax
n
(D)
)
(Lemma 29, and m ≥ O˜(n−3))
≥ (1− 2)Opt(D) (Lemma 32)
D Optimality in the Single-bidder Case
Here we present a brief discussion on the optimality of the dominated empirical algorithm proposed
in this paper in the special case with only one bidder. In this case, any truthful mechanism is
effectively offering a take-it-or-leave-it price. All four families of distributions have been studied
in this special case and the tight sample complexity is known for all of them up to a logarithmic
factor. We summarize the tight sample complexity from previous works in Table 3.
Setting Sample Complexity
Regular Θ˜(−3) [12]
(Continuous) MHR Θ˜(−1.5) [19]
[1, H] Θ˜(H−2) [19]
[0, 1] Θ˜(−2) [19]1
1 This bound is not explicitly stated in [19] but follows straight-
forwardly from the analysis framework therein.
Table 3: Summary of Sample Complexity with a Single Bidder
Let n = 1 in Table 2 compare with the bounds in Table 3. Our analysis matches the tight
sample complexity for [1, H]-bounded support distributions, [0, 1]-bounded support distributions,
and regular distributions. For MHR distributions, our upper bound in Table 2 applies to both
continuous and discrete MHR distributions while that by Huang et al. [19] considers only continuous
ones. Next, we will show in Appendix D.1 that our bound is in fact tight up to a logarithmic
factor for discrete MHR distributions. Finally, we will present in Appendix D.2 a more specialized
analysis for continuous MHR distributions, incorporating the techniques by Huang et al. [19], to
show that our algorithm also achieves the optimal sample complexity in Table 3 for continuous
MHR distributions.
D.1 Lower Bound for Discrete MHR Distributions
We will show the following sample complexity lower bound for discrete MHR distributions when
there is a single bidder, using the framework by Huang et al. [19].
Lemma 33 (Huang et al. [19], Theorem 4.2). If two distributions D1 and D2 have disjoint (1−3)-
approximate price sets, and there is a pricing algorithm that is (1− )-approximate for both D1 and
D2, then the algorithm uses at least Ω(DSKL(D1, D2)
−1) samples.
Theorem 3. Suppose an algorithm guarantees a (1− )-approximation with high probability for all
discrete MHR distributions using m samples. Then, m must be at least Ω(−2).
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Proof. Let D1 and D2 be two distributions with support {1, 2}. D1 takes value 1 with probability
1+4
2 , and 2 with probability
1−4
2 . D2 takes value 1 with probability
1−4
2 , and 2 with probability
1+4
2 . The KL divergence of the distributions is bounded by:
DSKL(D1, D2) = 2 ·
(
1+4
2 ln
1+4
1−4 +
1−4
2 ln
1−4
1+4
)
= 8 ln 1+41−4 = Θ(
2).
On one hand, any price that is at least a (1 − 3)-approximation for D1 must be at most 1
because the optimal is 1, which is achieved when the price is 1, but setting a price larger than 1
gets at most 1− 4, which is achieved when the price is 2. On the other hand, any price that is at
least a (1−3)-approximation for D2 must be greater than 1 because the optimal is 1+4, which is
achieved when the price is 2, but setting a price at most 1 gets at most 1, which is achieved when
the price is 1. Hence, D1 and D2 have disjoint (1− 3)-approximate price sets.
Therefore, the claim follows from Lemma 33.
D.2 Improved Upper Bound Continuous MHR Distributions
We will show the following improved sample complexity upper bound for Algorithm 1.
Theorem 4. For any 0 <  < 1 and any continuous MHR distribution D, suppose m is at least
O˜(−1.5). Then, Algorithm 1 returns a mechanism with an expected revenue at least (1−)Opt(D),
with high probability.
For any MHR distribution D, let R(q) = (qD)−1(q) · q denote the revenue of setting a reserve
price with quantile q. Let v∗ denote the optimal reserve price and let q∗ denote the corresponding
quantile. The following lemma by Huang et al. [19] is crucial for the getting the improved sample
complexity upper bound.
Lemma 34 (Huang et al. [19], Lemma 3.3). For any MHR distribution D, any 0 ≤ q ≤ 1:
R(q∗)−R(q) ≥ 1
4
(q∗ − q)2R(q∗) .
We will also use the following well known fact about continuous MHR distributions.
Lemma 35 (e.g., Huang et al. [19], Lemma 2.1). For any MHR distribution D, we have:
q∗ ≥ 1
e
.
The lemmas show two properties of single-bidder auction/pricing when the value distribution is
MHR. Lemma 34 shows that the gap between the expected revenue of a quantile and the optimal
revenue is lower bounded by a quadratic function of the corresponding quantile gap, which should
be maintained with high probability with enough samples. Lemma 35 asserts that small quantiles
cannot be optimal.
To prove Theorem 4, we need to show that with high probability the algorithm will not pick
any price with expected revenue less than (1 − )Opt(D). We will divide into two subcases and
analyze separately. First, suppose the quantile of the price is at least 19e . Then, we will make use of
Lemma 34 and present in Lemma 36 an analysis similar to that by Huang et al. [19], incorporating
the fact that we pick the price based on the dominated empirical distribution instead of the empirical
distribution. Otherwise, suppose the quantile of the price is less than 19e , i.e., much smaller than
the quantile of the optimal price according to Lemma 35. The reason why we need to handle this
case differently is that the dominated empirical distribution may have large estimation errors for
small quantiles, specifically, those that are at most O( 1m). We analyze this case in Lemma 37.
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Lemma 36. Suppose a sample value v has quantile q ≥ 19e and R(q) < (1− )R(q∗), and m is at
least O˜(−1.5). Then, the probability that Algorithm 1 picks v over v∗ is at most δm .
Proof. We will prove the lemma for q > q∗. The other case when 19e ≤ q ≤ q∗ is similar.
Let δq = q− q∗, and let ∆ be such that R(q) = (1−∆)R(q∗). Then, by the assumption on q in
the lemma, we have:
∆ ≥  . (22)
Further, by Lemma 34, we have:
∆ ≥ 1
4
δ2q . (23)
By the definition of the revenue curve R(q), we also have:
v · q = (1−∆) · v∗ · q∗ . (24)
Let q¯∗ and q¯ denote the empirical quantiles of v∗ and v. Noting that q∗ and q are both Θ(1), by
Bernstein inequality (Lemma 1), so are q¯∗ and q¯ and, subsequently, sm,n,δ(q¯∗) and sm,n,δ(q¯), with
high probability. In particular, by the definition of sm,n,δ with n = 1, we have:
∣∣q − sm,n,δ(q¯)∣∣ ≤ O
(√
ln(2mδ−1)
m
)
. (25)
Further, we have (with n = 1):
(
q¯ − q¯∗)− (sm,n,δ(q¯)− sm,n,δ(q¯∗)) = √2 ln(2mδ−1)
m
(√
q¯(1− q¯)−
√
q¯∗(1− q¯∗)
)
=
√
2 ln(2mδ−1)
m
(q¯ − q¯∗)(1− q¯ − q¯∗)√
q¯(1− q¯) +√q¯∗(1− q¯∗)
= O
(√
ln(2mδ−1)
m
)
· (q¯ − q¯∗) (q¯, q¯∗ = Θ(1))
= O
(√
ln(2mδ−1)
m
)
· δq . (26)
Next, consider the event that the algorithm picks v over v∗. By the definition of the algorithm,
that means:
v · sm,n,δ(q¯) ≥ v∗ · sm,n,δ(q¯∗) . (27)
We claim that it means there must be a much bigger gap between dominated empirical quantiles
q¯ and q¯∗ than that between the actual quantiles. This is formalized with the following sequence of
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inequalities:
q¯ − q¯∗ +O
(√
ln(2mδ−1)
m
)
· δq ≥ sm,n,δ(q¯)− sm,n,δ(q¯∗) (Eqn. (26))
= sm,n,δ(q¯)
(
1− sm,n,δ(q¯
∗)
sm,n,δ(q¯)
)
≥ sm,n,δ(q¯)
(
1− v
v∗
)
(Eqn. (27))
= sm,n,δ(q¯)
(
1− (1−∆) · q
∗
q
)
(Eqn. (24))
≥
(
q −O
(√
ln(2mδ−1)
m
))(
1− (1−∆) · q
∗
q
)
(Eqn. (25))
≥ q − q∗ −O
(√
ln(2mδ−1)
m
)
· δq + Ω(∆) (q∗, q = Θ(1)) .
Further note that by Eqn. (22), Eqn. (23), and that m ≥ O˜(−1.5), we have:
∆ ≥ O
(√
ln(2mδ−1)
m
)
· δq
Hence, we get that:
q¯ − q¯∗ ≥ q − q∗ + Ω(∆) .
It remains to upper bound the probability that the above inequality holds. Note that it means
that the fraction of samples that fall betwen q∗ and q is larger than its expectation δq by at least
Ω(∆). By Bernstein inequality (Lemma 1), we have:
Pr [q¯ − q¯∗ ≥ q − q∗ + Ω(∆)] ≤ e−Ω(∆2mδ−1q ) ≤ δ
m
,
where the last inequality holds because ∆2δ−1q ≥ ∆−1.5 ≥ 1.5 (due to Eqn. (22) and Eqn. (23))
and that m ≥ O˜(−1.5).
Lemma 37. Suppose a sample value v has quantile q < 19e , and m is at least O˜(
−1.5). Then, the
probability that Algorithm 1 picks v over v∗ is at most δm .
Proof. Note that in this lemma we no longer need the assumption that R(q) < (1−)R(q∗) because
it holds for all value with quantile less than 19e due to Lemma 34 and that q <
1
9e and q
∗ ≥ 1e
(Lemma 35). In fact, the lemma asserts something stronger. For some constant c < 1, we have:
v · q = R(q) ≤ cR(q∗) = c · v∗ · q∗
Let q¯∗ and q¯ denote the empirical quantiles of v∗ and v. By Bernstein’s inequality, with proba-
bility at least 1− δ2m , we have:
q¯∗ ≥ q − O˜
(
1√
m
)
.
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Further, by the definition of sm,n,δ with n = 1, we have:
sm,n,δ(q¯
∗) ≥ q¯∗ − O˜
(
1√
m
)
Putting together, we get that:
sm,n,δ(q¯
∗) > c · q∗
On the other hand, by Lemma 6 we get that with probability, δ2m we have D  E˜ and, in
particular, we have:
sm,n,δ(q¯) ≤ q .
Therefore, taking a union bound over the above two events, the revenue of v and v∗ in w.r.t.
the dominated empirical distribution satisfy the following with probability at least 1− δ:
v · sm,n,δ(q¯) ≤ v · q < c · v∗ · q∗ < v∗ · sm,n,δ(q¯∗) .
This means that the algorithm will not pick v over v∗. So the lemma follows.
Given the lemmas, we can now get the sample complexity bound in Theorem 4 by taking a
union bound over all m samples.
E Lower Bound for Continuous MHR Distributions
The proof of the sample complexity lower bound for MHR distributions in Section 4 makes use of
discrete MHR distributions in the construction of the hard instance. If we insist on using MHR
distributions whose supports are continuous intervals, our meta lower bound framework still gives
the following weaker lower bound of Ω(n3/2), which nonetheless improves the previous best known
bound by Cole and Roughgarden [10]. We stress that our sample complexity upper bound hold for
both discrete and continuous MHR distributions.
We will follow the meta analysis in Section 4 and proceed by constructing three distribution Db,
Dh, and D` and verify the conditions listed in Section 4. Let 0 =  lnn. Let v0 = lnn− 1 +√0,
v1 = lnn, v2 = ln
n
1+
√
0
≈ lnn − √0, p = 2
√
0
n , and ∆ =
√
0 be the parameters. Let D
b be a
singleton at v0 = lnn − 1 +√0. Let the probability mass at v1 be 1ne−3
√
0(v1−v2) ≈ 1−30n in Dh
and 1n in D
`. Further, define Dh and D` with the following pdf for 0 ≤ v < v1:
fDh(v) =
{
e−v 0 ≤ v < v2
(1 + 3
√
0)e
−(1+3√0)v+3√0v2 v2 ≤ v < v1
fD`(v) = e
−v
The corresponding complementary cdf are as follows, via simple calculations:
1− FDh(v) =

e−v 0 ≤ v < v2
e−(1+3
√
0)v+3
√
0v2 v2 ≤ v < v1
0 v = v1
1− FD`(v) =
{
e−v 0 ≤ v < v2
0 v = v1
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Figure 4: The left-hand-size and the right-hand-side are the revenue curves, in the quantile space,
of Dh and D` respectively used in the lower bound for continuous MHR distributions, with n = 10,
and 0 = 0.1. The critical value interval between v2 and v1 is plotted in bold (red).
Conditions a), b), c), f), and h) hold trivially by the construction. Condition j) follows by the
construction and Lemma 27, with Ω1 = [0, v2), 1 = 0, Ω2 = [v2, v1), 2 = 3
√
0, and Ω3 = {v1},
3 = 30. Further, conditions d), e), and g) can be verified from the virtual values of D
h and D`
below, which follows from straightforward calculations:
φDh(v) =

v − 1 0 ≤ v < v1
v − 11+3√0 ≈ v − 1 + 3
√
0 v2 ≤ v < v1
lnn v = v1
φD`(v) =
{
v − 1 0 ≤ v < v2
lnn v = v1
To show condition i), by our choice of p and ∆, it remains to show that Opt(D) ≤ O(lnn)
for all D ∈ H. This holds trivially because the values are upper bounded by lnn in all three
distributions Db, Dh, and D`. Putting together shows the weaker lower bound of Ω˜(n−3/2).
F Matroid Constraint: Upper Bound
In this section, we generalize our analysis of sample complexity upper bound to single-parameter
auctions where each bidder is unit-demanded and the allocation has to meet a matroid constraint
M = ([n], I) with rank k. Readers may think of the k-uniform matroid, i.e., there are k copies of
the item and therefore any feasible allocation can allocate to up to k bidders, as a running example.
Formally, we define auction with matroid constraint as follows:
Definition 1 (Auction with matroid constraint). An auction with matroid constraint of rank k is
specified by an integer k ∈ [n] a matroid M = ([n], I) with rank k, where the allocation vector x
must be probabilistic combination of indicator function of independent sets of M.
For simplicity, we only consider the case of [0, 1]-bounded support distributions with additive
error. We will show that our algorithm can guarantee an up to  error to the optimal expected
revenue with O˜(kn
2
) samples.
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Theorem 5. For any 0 <  < 12 , any n-bidder product value distribution D bounded in [0, 1]
n, any
k ∈ [n] and any matroid constraint M = ([n], I) with rank k, Algorithm 1 returns a mechanism
with an expected revenue at least Opt(D)−O() with high probability, if m is at least Ω˜(kn−2).
In particular, this bound holds for the k-uniform matroid, which corresponds to having k
identical copies of the item. Further, we will establish for this case a matching lower bound,
up to a polylogarithmic factor, in Appendix G
Corollary 38. For any 0 <  < 12 , any n-bidder product value distribution D bounded in [0, 1]
n,
any k ∈ [n] such that the total number of identical items is k and each bidder has unit-demand,
Algorithm 1 returns a mechanism with an expected revenue at least Opt(D)−O(), with probability
at least 1− o(1), if m is at least Ω˜(kn−2).
Similar to the single-item case, we use a two-step argument to show the sample complexity
upper bound: the first step uses revenue monotonicity and the second step uses information theory.
Our result for the second step can be generated into a broader class of auctions, which is stated as
follows:
To show this lemma, we use a hybrid argument: First partition [n] into k groups of size nk
as B1, · · · , Bk, then define k + 1 hybrid distributions D0, · · · ,Dk where D0 = D˜′, Dk = D′
(here D′ is the auxiliary distribution defined in Lemma 12), and ∀i ∈ [k], Di is the product of
marginal auxiliary distributions for bidders in ∪ij=1Bj and their doubly shaded version for bidders
in ∪kj=i+1Bj . Therefore ∀i ∈ [k + 1], Di  Di−1. We then show an upper bound of Opt(Di) −
Opt(Di−1) for all i using information theory.
Definition 2 (Hybrid Distributions). Let B1, . . . , Bk be a partition of [n] and each group has
size nk . Define Di to be shaded surrogate only on the coordinates that belong to
⋃k
`=1+1B`, i.e.,
Di
def
=
∏
j∈∪i`=1B` D
′
j ×
∏
j∈∪k`=i+1B` D˜
′
j.
Lemma 39. For any partition B1, · · · , Bk of [n] where each group has size nk , and ∀2 ≤ i ≤ k,
DSKL(Di,Di−1) = O˜
(
n
km
)
.
Proof. According to Lemma 10 in Section 3, ∀j ∈ Bi:
DSKL(D
′
j , D˜
′
j) ≤ O(
ln(mnδ−1) ln(nk−1)
m
) = O˜(
1
m
)
Therefore,
DSKL(Di,Di−1) ≤
∑
j∈Bi
DSKL(D
′
j , D˜
′
j) = O˜(
n
km
)
Lemma 40 (Bernstein’s inequality for sampling without replacement, e.g., [? ]). Let X =
(x1, · · · , xN ) be a finite population of N points and (X1, · · · , Xn) be a random sample drawn with-
out replacement from X . Suppose ∀i ∈ [N ], xi ∈ [a, b], let µ = 1N
∑N
i=1 xi be the mean of X , and
σ2 = 1N
∑N
i=1(xi − µ)2 be the variance of X , then
Pr
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
(Xi − µ) ≥ 
]
≤ exp(− n
2
2σ2 + (2/3)(b− a)) .
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Lemma 41. For any distribution D that has support in [0, 1]n and any deterministic allocation
rule x(v), there exists a partition P = {B1 · · ·Bk} that separate [n] into k groups of size nk , such
that,
Prv∈D
∀i ∈ [k],∑
j∈Bi
xj(v) ≤ O(log n

)
 ≥ 1− 
4nk2
.
Proof. Suppose P is the set of all partitions that separate [n] into k groups of size nk . Let U(P) be
the uniform distribution of P, if for all v ∈ [0, 1]n,
PrP∼U(P)
∃i ∈ [k], such that ∑
j∈Bi
xj(v) ≥ 3 log n

 ≤ 
4nk2
, (28)
Then
Prv∼D,P∼U(P)
∃i ∈ [k], such that ∑
j∈Bi
xj(v) ≥ 3 log n

 ≤ 
4nk2
Therefore ∃P ∈ P,
Prv∼D
∃i ∈ [k], such that ∑
j∈Bi
xj(v) ≥ 3 log n

 ≤ 
4nk2
.
So it suffices to show (28). Fix v ∈ [0, 1]n, for all i ∈ [k], {xj(v)}j∈Bi is a random sample (without
replacement) of k elements in {xj(v)}j∈[n], which has exactly k 1’s and n− k 0’s. Then according
to Bernstein’s inequality for sampling without replacement (Lemma 40), if  < n2k ,
PrP∼U(P)
∑
j∈Bi
xj(v)− 1 > 4 log(n

)
 ≤ exp(− 16 log2(n/)
2(n− k)/n+ 8/3 · log(n/)) ≤
4
n4
≤ 
8nk3
Therefore from union bound,
PrP∼U(P)
∃i ∈ [k], such that ∑
j∈Bi
xj(v) ≥ 4 log n

 ≤ 
4nk2
.
Corollary 42. There exists a partition P = {B1, B2 · · · , Bk} that partitions [n] into k groups of
size nk such that for any i ∈ [k],
Prv∈Di
∀l ∈ [k],∑
j∈Bl
xj(v) ≤ O(log n

)
 ≥ 1− 
4kn
,
Proof. We can choose the D in Lemma 41 to be 1k
∑k
i=1 Di, then we have
1
k
k∑
i=1
Prv∈Di
∀l ∈ [k],∑
j∈Bl
xj(v) ≤ O(log n

)
 ≥ 1− 
4nk2
.
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Lemma 43. ([? ], Corollary 39.12a) If both I and I ′ are independent sets of matroid M = ([n], I)
and |I| = |I ′|, then there exists a perfect matching M between I\I ′ and I ′\I such that for each
i ∈ I\I ′ and j ∈ I ′\I such that (i, j) ∈M , we have I ∪ {j}\{i} ∈ I and I ′ ∪ {i}\{j} ∈ I.
Lemma 44. For any matroid M = ([n], I), any weight function v : [n] → Rn, and any fixed
tie-breaking rule, suppose I is the maximum weighted independent set of I regarding v (assume
elements with 0 weight are always not included), then ∀i ∈ [n], ∀ weight function v′ : [n]→ Rn such
that v′(i) ≤ v(i) and v′(j) = v(j) for any j 6= i, the maximal weighted independent set J of (M, v′)
satisfy I\J ⊆ {i}.
Proof. Suppose j ∈ I\J and j 6= i.
First, |I| ≥ |J | otherwise another element from J could be added to I to form a new independent
set, but any element in J is positive, which contradicts with the definition of I. For the same reason,
if v′(i) > 0 then |J | ≥ |I|, if v′(i) ≤ 0 then |J | ≥ |I| − 1.
For the case when |J | = |I|, then from Lemma 43, ∃k ∈ J\I, such that I ∪ {k}\{j} ∈ I and
I ′ ∪ {k}\{j} ∈ I. If v(j) < v(k), then the total value of I ∪ {k}\{j} should be larger than that of
I, which contradicts to its definition; if v(j) > v(k), then J ∪ {j}\{k} should be larger than that
of J , which also leads to a contradiction.
For the case when |J | = |I| − 1, we have v′(i) ≤ 0. From Lemma 43, ∃k ∈ J\I, such that
I ∪ {k}\{j, i} ∈ I and J ∪ {j}\{k} ∈ I. Because |I ∪ {k}\{i, j}| < |I|, we have I ∪ {k}\{i} ∈ I
or I ∪ {k}\{j} ∈ I. But if I ∪ {k}\{i} ∈ I, |I ∪ {k}\{i}| > |J | and each of its element is positive,
contradicting with the definition of J , so I ∪ {k}\{j} ∈ I. If v(j) < v(k), then the total value of
I ∪{k}\{j} should be larger than that of I, which contradicts to its definition; if v(j) > v(k), then
J ∪ {j}\{k} should be larger than that of J , which also leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 45. For any j ∈ [k], let pl be the payment function of MDj
Opt(Dj)−Opt(Dj−1) ≤ Ev∼Dj
∑
l∈Bj
pl(v)−Ev∼Dj−1
∑
l∈Bj
pl(v)
Proof. Let v
(j)
i (q) be the inverse of quantile function for bidder i on distribution Dj and v
(j)(q)
be the vector of quantile functions. First Opt(Dj) −Opt(Dj−1) is bounded by Rev(MDj ,Dj) −
Rev(MDj ,Dj−1), and because for i = j or i = j − 1,
Rev(MDj ,Di) =
∫
q∈[0,1]n
∑
l∈[n]\Bj
xl(v
(i)(q))φl(v
(i)
l (ql))dq +
∑
l∈Bj
Ev∼Dipl(v) ,
so it suffices to show that for any q ∈ [0, 1]n and any l ∈ [n]\Bj ,
xl(v
(j)(q)) ≥ xl(v(j−1)(q)) .
If we view the ironed virtual value of Dj as a weight of the matroid M, MDj picks the maximum
weighted independent set as winners. Suppose the set of winners for Dj and Dj−1 are respectively
Ij and Ij−1 Because for any l ∈ [n]\Bj , v(j)l (ql) = v(j−1)l (ql), and for any l ∈ Bj , v(j)l (ql) ≥ v(j−1)l (ql),
we can apply Lemma 44 to every elements in Bj sequentially and get Ij\Ij−1 ⊆ Bj .
Lemma 46. For any 0 <  < 12 , any n-bidder product value distribution D bounded in [0, 1]
n, any
k ∈ [n] and any matroid constraint M = ([n], I) with rank k, it holds when m = Ω˜(kn−2),
Opt(D′)−Opt(D˜′) ≤  ,
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where
D′i = t
min
/k2 ◦ tmaxv¯ (Di) , v¯i = sup{v : qDi(v) ≥
2
nk2
} ,
and
D˜′i = dm,n,δ(D
′
i) .
Proof. We will use a proof similar to Lemma 9 to show that for any 1 ≤ j ≤ k, Opt(Dj) −
Opt(Dj−1) ≤ /k. But instead of considering the difference between Opt(Dj) and Opt(Dj−1) ≤
/k, we consider the payment of bidders in Bj , i.e.,
Ev∼Dj
∑
l∈Bj
pl(v)−Ev∼Dj−1
∑
l∈Bj
pl(v)
According to Lemma 45, the difference between Opt(Dj) and Opt(Dj−1) is upper bounded by
that. Choose N in Lemma 9 to be O˜( 
2
k2
).
On the one hand, DSKL(Dj,Dj−1) = O˜
(
n
km
)
= O˜( 
2
k2
) by Lemma 39.
On the other hand, consider the following algorithm: Take N samples v1, · · · ,vN, calculate
1
N
∑N
s=1
∑
l∈Bj min(pl(vs), 3 log
n
 ) .
According to Corollary 42, for i = j or j−1, Ev∼Di
∑
l∈Bi min(pl(v), 3 log
n
 ) and Ev∼Di
∑
l∈Bi pl(v)
differ by at most 4kn ∗ dnk e ≤ 4k . And use Bernstein inequality (Lemma 1), we have
Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
s=1
∑
l∈Bi
min(pl(vs), 3 log
n

)−Ev∼Di
∑
l∈Bi
min(pl(v), 3 log
n

)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 2k
 ≤ e− ( Nk )218N log2 n +2 log(n ) Nk = o(1)
Therefore, with probability 1−o(1), the algorithm approximate Ev∼Di
∑
l∈Bi pl(v) with an additive
factor of 4k +

2k ≤ k .
Proof. (of Theorem 5) We need to show that when m = Ω˜(kn−2)
Opt(D)−Opt(D˜) ≤ 3
Then, by Lemma 8,
Rev(ME˜,D) ≥ Opt(D˜) ≥ Opt(D)− 3
Since for all [0, 1]-bounded support product distribution D,
Opt(D)−Opt(tmaxv¯ (D)) ≤ k ·Pr
[∃i ∈ [n] : vi > v¯i] (at most k items, values bounded by 1)
≤ k ·
n∑
i=1
Pr
[
vi > v¯i
]
(union bound)
≤ k ·
n∑
i=1
2
nk
(definition of v¯i’s)
= 2 .
and since if we run MD on t
min
/k2(D), then with probability at least (1− k2 )k, allocation is the same
as running MD on D, we have
Opt(D)−Opt(tmin/k2(D)) ≤ Opt(D)−Rev(MD, tmin/k2(D))
≤ (1− (1− 
k2
)k) · k
≤ 
k
· k = 
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we have
Opt(D′) = Opt(tmin/k2 ◦ tmaxv¯ (D))
≥ Opt(tmaxv¯ (D))− 
≥ Opt(D)− 2 (29)
Then from D˜  D˜′, we have:
Opt(D)−Opt(D˜) ≤ Opt(D)−Opt(D˜′) (weak revenue monotoinicity)
= (Opt(D)−Opt(D′)) + (Opt(D′)−Opt(D˜′))
≤ 2+  = 3 ((29) and Lemma 46)
Combine this and Lemma 8, we get Rev(ME˜,D) ≥ Opt(D)− 3.
G Matroid Constraint: Lower Bound
In this section always assume n ≥ 2k, and all bidders’ valuation are bounded in [0, 1]. We will show
that the sample complexity lower bound of k-unit demand auction coincides with its upper bound,
which is Ω˜(nk−2). We first define a family of distribution H. Let
H = {D : D1 = D2 = · · ·Dk = Db, and Di = Dh or D` for all k < i ≤ n} .
where Db, D` and Dh satisfy
Db is a point distribution at 1/2
fD`(v) =

1− k2n v = v3
def
= 1/2 + k8n
k−
4n v = v2
def
= 34
k+
4n v = v1
def
= 1
fDh(v) =

1− k2n v = v3 = 1/2 + k8n
k+
4n v = v2 =
3
4
k−
4n v = v1 = 1.
We can verify that
φ`(v2) + /2k ≤ 1/2 ≤ φh(v2)− /2k (30)
and √
2 ≥ dD
`
dDh
(v2) ≥ 1√
2
. (31)
Define
Vi =
{
b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn), b1 = · · · = bk = 1
2
, bi = v2, and |{j|bj ≥ v2}| ≤ k
}
.
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Theorem 6. If an algorithm A takes m samples from an arbitrary product value distribution
D ∈ H′ and returns, with probability at least 0.99, a mechanism whose expected revenue is at least:
Opt(D)−O() .
Then, the number of samples m is at least:
Ω(nk−2) .
Fix any i, and any D−i = ×j 6=iDj such that D1 = · · · = Dk = Db and Dj ∈ {Dh, D`} for all
j 6= 1, i. Let D1 = (D−i, Di = Dh) ∈ H and D2 = (D−i, Di = D`) ∈ H be a pair of distributions
that differ only in the i-th coordinate. Then, we have:
DSKL
(
D1,D2
)
= DSKL(D
h, D`) = O(
2
nk
) .
The second inequality follows from Lemma 27 by choosing Ω1 = {v3}, 1 = 0 and Ω2 = {v1, v2},
2 =

2k . Then, since algorithm A takes m < c · DSKL(Dh, D`)−1 = c · DSKL(D1,D2)−1 samples
for some sufficiently small constant c, by Lemma 4, it cannot distinguish whether the underlying
distribution is D1 or D2 correctly, and as a result will choose a mechanism from essentially the
same distribution in both cases.
Lemma 47. For any mechanism M , the probability that M picks bidder i (i ∈ I) as the winner,
conditioned on the value vector v is in VI,J , differs by at most a factor of 2 whether v is drawn
from D1 or D2.
Proof. Same as Lemma 19 using Equation 31.
Define
M1 =
{
M : Prv∼D1:v∈Vi
[
M picks i as the winner
] ≥ 2
3
}
,
M2 =
{
M : Prv∼D1:v∈Vi
[
M picks i as the winner
]
<
2
3
}
.
Corollary 48. For any M ∈M1, we have that:
Prv∼D2:v∈Vi
[
M picks i as the winner
] ≥ 1
3
.
Lemma 49. For either j = 1 or j = 2 (or both), we have:
Pr
[
A(Dj) ∈M3−j] > 1
3
.
Proof. Same as Lemma 21.
Lemma 50. For any value distribution D ∈ H, the optimal mechanism w.r.t. D always chooses
the bidder with k highest virtual values as winners.
Proof. The virtual value and ironed virtual value of Db, Dh and D` are as follows:
φ¯b(v) = φb(v) =
1
2
55
φ¯h(v) = φh(v) =

1
2 v3 = 1/2 +
k
8n
k+2
2(k+) v2 =
3
4
1 v1 = 1
φ`(v) =

1
2 v3 = 1/2 +
k
8n
k−2
2(k−) v2 =
3
4
1 v1 = 1
φ¯`(v) =

4n−k−2
2(4n−k−) v3 = 1/2 +
k
8n
4n−k−2
2(4n−k−) v2 =
3
4
1 v1 = 1
Since 4n−k−22(4n−k−) < 1/2 and the first k bidders all have a constant ironed virtual value of 1/2, a
bidder with v ≤ v2 would never be chosen if his distribution is D`. So the k highest virtual values
always coincide with k highest ironed virtual values.
In the following discussion, Let IA(Dj) denote the set of winners chosen by A(D
j).
The revenue of optimal mechanism is∫
v
max
|J |=k
∑
j∈J
φj(vj)dD ,
Now we only consider the case when v ∈ ∪iVi. According to the definition of Vi, the number of
bidders whose value are over v2 is at most k. Therefore all bidders with value v1, all bidders with
value v2 and having distribution D
h, and some bidders among b1 to bk will be selected as winners
in the optimal mechanism. Therefore when the valuation vector is in Vi, selecting bidder i with
distribution D` would cause a loss of at least 1/2 − φ`(v2) ≥ 2k , and not selecting bidder i with
distribution Dh would cause a revenue loss of at least φl(v2)− 1/2 ≥ 2k . We define this loss to be
Li(A(D
j),v).
Li(A(D
j),v) =


2k · I(i /∈ IA(Dj)(v)) if j = 1 and v ∈ Vi

2k · I(i ∈ IA(Dj)(v))) if j = 2 and v ∈ Vi
0 otherwise
Then if we only consider the revenue loss caused by misclassifying bidder i’s type on valuation
profile ∪iVi, we can lower bound the revenue gap between A(Dj) and optimal mechanism:∫
v∈∪iVi
max|J |=k∑
j∈J
φj(vj)−
∑
j∈I
A(Dj)
(v)
φj(vj)
 dD
≥
∫
v∈∪iVi
∑
i>k
Li(A(D
j),v)dD
=
∑
i>k
∫
v∈Vi
Li(A(D
j),v)dD
(32)
We will consider this quantity in the following discussion:∫
v∈Vi
Li(A(D
j),v)dD
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Lemma 51. For either j = 1 or j = 2 (or both), we have:
PrA(Dj)
[
Ev∼Dj :v∈Vi
[
Li(A(D
j),v)
] ≥ 
6k
]
≥ 1
3
.
Proof. According to Lemma 49, we have either
Pr
[
A(Dj) ∈M3−j] > 1
3
for j = 1, 2.We will consider the two cases separately,
Case 1: j = 1. From definition of M2, we have
Prv∼D1:v∈Vi
[
M picks i as the winnner
]
<
2
3
.
From Equation 30, we have
Ev∼D1:v∈Vi
[
Li(A(D
1),v)
] ≥ 1
3
· 
2k
=

6k
.
Case 2: j = 2. From A(D2) ∈M1 and Corollary 48, we know that
Prv∼D2:v∈Vi
[
M picks i as the winner
] ≥ 1
3
Therefore,
Ev∼D2:v∈Vi
[
Li(A(D
2),v)
] ≥ 1
3
· 
2k
=

6k
.
Thus the lemma holds.
Let BD be
BD =
{
i : PrA(D)
[
Ev∼D:v∈Vi
[
Li(A(D
j),v)
] ≥ 
6k
]
≥ 1
3
}
,
then Lemma 24, Corollary 25 and Lemma 26 still holds.
Lemma 52. For any D ∈ H and i > k,
Prv∼D[v ∈ Vi] = Θ(k/n).
Proof. v ∈ Vi is equivalent to say that bi = v2 and there are no more than k − 1 other bidders has
value over v2. The two events are independent and probability of the first part is at between
k−
4n
and k+4n .
Let Zj be the indicator of whether bj ≥ v2, since the expected number of bidder that has value
over v2 is (n− k) k2n ≤ k2 , we can bound the probability of second part by Bernstein’s inequality:
Pr
 ∑
j 6=i,j>k
Zi ≥ k − 1
 ≤ e− (k/2−1)2/2(n−k−1)(k/n)+(k/2−1)/3 = o(1) .
Therefore the total probability is between k−4n · (1− o(1)) and k+4n .
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Now we can prove Theorem 6:
Opt(D)−Rev(A(D),D)
=
∫
v
max|J |=k∑
j∈J
φj(vj)−
∑
j∈I
A(Dj)
(v)
φj(vj)
 dD
≥
∑
i∈BD,A(D)
∫
v∈Vi
Li(A(D
j),v)dD (Equation 32)
=
∑
i∈BD,A(D)
Ev∼D:v∈Vi
[
Li(A(D
j),v)
] ·Prv∼D[v ∈ Vi]
≥
∑
i∈BD,A(D)

3k
·Prv∼D
[
v ∈ Vi
]
(definition of BD,A(D))
= Θ() (Lemma 26 and Lemma 52) .
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